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Personal Jurisdiction and National
Sovereignty
Ray Worthy Campbell*
Abstract
State sovereignty, once seemingly sidelined in personal
jurisdiction analysis, has returned with a vengeance. Driven by the
idea that states must not offend rival states in their jurisdictional
reach, some justices have looked for specific targeting of individual
states as individual states by the defendant in order to justify an
assertion of personal jurisdiction. To allow cases to proceed based
on national targeting alone, they argue, would diminish the
sovereignty of any state that the defendant had specifically targeted.
This Article looks for the first time at how this emphasis on
state sovereignty limits national sovereignty, especially where alien
defendants are involved. By requiring an antecedent “top of mind”
focus on the forum state when actions that lead to litigation are
taken, the Court would exclude from U.S. litigation activities that
bear a close relationship to the forum and that would provide a
basis for jurisdiction in many, if not most, other nations. This
matters especially because the U.S. conducts so much of its national
regulation through litigation in state courts and through litigation
based on state causes of action. This Article gives fresh emphasis to
the notion that states are members of a shared sovereignty, and that
state actions implicate national sovereignty as much as actions by
the federal branch of government.
The problem is compounded by the incoherency of the Court’s
“our federalism” state sovereignty analysis. Other commentators
* Professor of Law, Peking University School of Transnational Law. Thanks
are due to my colleagues at Peking University School of Transnational Law, who
gave many helpful comments, including Stephen Minas, Mark Feldman, Charles
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are also due to my research assistants, Hu Yayun, Jin Yuting, and Zhang Tiying,
and to my co-author on an earlier piece, Ellen Claar Campbell, who helped
develop some of the ideas that led to this article.
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have not focused on how the Court’s assumption in recent personal
jurisdiction cases that states are in purely rivalrous relationships
contrasts with reality, which is increasingly recognized to involve
overlapping, reinforcing, sometimes coordinated spheres of
jurisdiction. Rather than treating the states as rivals involved in a
zero-sum game, where an assertion of power by one undercuts the
power and dignity of another, this Article looks at the polycentric,
pluralistic nature of U.S. governance, where state members of a
“more perfect union” coordinate, collaborate, pursue shared goals
independently, and only sometimes compete.
State sovereignty ultimately is national sovereignty. To
exaggerate concepts of state rivalry and exclusiveness in a modern
age of legal pluralism serves only to diminish the regulatory reach
of individual states, and, ultimately, the nation as a whole. The
Court’s narrow focus on sovereignty threatens to make the scope of
U.S. jurisdiction far narrower than that of other nations, and by
Constitutionalizing that scope to make adjustments in rapidly
changing circumstances difficult.
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I. Introduction
State sovereignty, once seemingly sidelined in personal
jurisdiction analysis, has returned with a vengeance. Driven by the
idea that states must not infringe upon the territorial sovereignty
of sister states when asserting personal jurisdiction, some Justices
have looked for proof that the defendant targeted a state
individually and specifically, and not as part of a group, in order to
justify an assertion of personal jurisdiction.1 To do otherwise, they
argue, would diminish whichever other state the plaintiff chose to
have a direct relationship with.2 In some cases, the targeting has
not been found.3 The Court applies this logic even when the
defendant is foreign, and despite targeting of the nation as a whole
by a foreign defendant.4 Cases with a close connection to forum
state compensatory and regulatory interests have been dismissed.5
1. See infra notes 147–157 and accompanying text.
2. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011)
(reasoning that “each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful
intrusion by other States”).
3. See id. at 886 (finding that petitioner did not engage in conduct
purposefully directed at New Jersey).
4. See id. (“[I]t is petitioner’s purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with
the United States, that alone are relevant.”).
5. For example, in Nicastro the plurality acknowledged New Jersey’s

100

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (2020)

The problem is that this emphasis on state sovereignty limits
national sovereignty, at least where alien defendants are
involved.6 By requiring an antecedent “top of mind” focus on the
forum state when actions that lead to litigation are taken, the
Court can exclude from U.S. litigation—and hence from U.S.
after-the-fact regulation via litigation—activities that bear a close
relationship to the forum and that would provide a basis for
jurisdiction in many, if not most, other nations.7
The problem is compounded by the incoherency of the Court’s
“our federalism” analysis.8 If the Court is serious about “our
federalism,” the analysis employed must focus realistically on how
our government actually functions under the Constitution. First,
rather than looking at states as unconnected sovereigns, the
analysis should take into account that states are members of a
shared sovereignty, and that state actions implicate national
sovereignty as much as actions by the federal branch of
government.9 Next, rather than treating the states as rivals
strong interest in protecting its citizens, 564 U.S. at 887, and the dissent argued
that, of all states, New Jersey’s connections made it the best suited state for trial
of the matter, 564 U.S. at 898.
6. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens,
116 MICH. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2018) (arguing for a reconsideration of the
conventional personal jurisdiction approach to alien defendants).
7. See id. at 1239 (“[I]t is unclear why a particular state could not
legitimately exercise jurisdiction on behalf of the United States based on national
contacts.”).
8. “Our federalism” most often is used to refer to the distribution of power
and responsibilities between the states and the federal government. See Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (explaining that Our Federalism is grounded in
“the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways”). In the recent personal jurisdiction cases, the Court uses “our federalism”
to discuss sovereignty conflicts amongst states, but without engaging in an
analysis of the horizontal federalism issues involved. See infra Part III.
9. See David Brian Robertson, Federalism and American Political
Development, in THE O XFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 346 (Richard M. Valelly et al. eds., 2016) (“The framers resolved
these conflicts with a series of political compromises that required the national
government and the states to share government sovereignty. James Madison
described this system as ‘partly federal, partly national’ or as a ‘compound
republic.’” (emphasis in original)); VINCENT OSTROM & BARBARA ALLEN, T HE
POLITICAL T HEORY OF A C OMPOUND R EPUBLIC : D ESIGNING THE AMERICAN
EXPERIMENT 88 (3d ed. 2008) (illustrating that the form of government is a
collaborative one “by which several smaller states agree to become members of a
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involved in a zero sum game, where an assertion of power by one
undercuts the power and dignity of another, the Court should
recognize the polycentric, pluralistic nature of U.S. governance,
where state members of a “more perfect union” coordinate,
collaborate, pursue shared goals independently, and only
sometimes compete.10 Finally, while there are legitimate
horizontal federalism concerns to consider even in a pluralistic
state, the analysis employed should look directly and sensitively to
those concerns, rather than letting the antecedent state of mind of
a defendant control.11
II. Personal Jurisdiction and Regulatory Scope over Aliens
Personal jurisdiction matters.12 Jurisdiction unlocks the
power of courts to adjudicate.13 More than in most world
jurisdictions, in the United States the power to adjudicate
translates to the power to regulate.14 Much U.S. regulation takes
place through after-the-fact litigation.15 Since the power to
larger one” (emphasis in original)).
10. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 868
(2006)
Ongoing debates over federalism, for example, seem trapped in
unnecessarily binary conceptions of the vertical allocation of power.
Yet, a third way for the resolution of federalism questions—and one
more closely comporting with the realities of day-to-day
governance —might well be found in the overlap and dependence of
intersystemic and dialectical regulation.
11. See Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around
Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 769, 786 (2015) (“The problem is that the Court is trying to squeeze
a ‘which governments’ federalism question into the framework of individual
rights, where it does not fit comfortably and creates confusion.”).
12. See Austen Parrish, Personal Jurisdiction: The Transnational Difference,
59 VA. J. I NT ’L L. 97, 100 (2019) (describing personal jurisdiction as “one of the
doctrinal plains upon which broader and more salient debates related to global
governance, international law, and sovereign authority are waged”).
13. See Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
jurisdiction as a “court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree”).
14. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE : P UBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE L AWSUITS IN THE U NITED STATES 8 (2010) (noting that American civil
litigation “contrast[s] sharply with European practices”).
15. See id. (“[I]mplementation of regulatory commands through private
lawsuits can effectively encourage and induce compliance behavior by the
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regulate, and the accompanying power to protect citizens and
markets, is an important element of sovereignty, cutting off
jurisdiction can limit sovereignty.16 Personal jurisdiction can only
be understood in the context of the broader regulatory setting.
A. After-the-Fact Regulation
In the U.S. system, litigation plays a special role, far broader
than resolving disputes between individual parties.17 To some, the
U.S. seems to have a relatively weak regulatory capacity.18 In
reality, taking into account the broader nature of what constitutes
regulation, much of the regulatory work of both state and federal
governments takes place through the judicial system.19
As one scholar has put it: “What is distinctive about the United
States is the extent to which we regulate not entry but
consequences. There is a significant difference between an
unregulated market and a deregulated market featuring low entry
costs but careful scrutiny after the fact.”20 In some cases, this
after-the-fact regulation has been the result of deliberate choices

regulated population . . . .”).
16. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324–25 (Black, J.,
concurring) (stressing the importance of states’ ability to exercise judicial
authority).
17. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy,
65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1660 (2016) (“Litigation is often conflated with dispute
resolution and law declaration (or adjudication), but it has its own independent
contribution to make to the American system of government.”).
18. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 19–59 (examining the relationship
between the United States’s weak administrative state and its large private
enforcement regime); Colin D. Moore, Bureaucracy and the Administrative State,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL D EVELOPMENT 328 (Richard
M. Valelly et al. eds., 2016) (“Compared to the robust and centralized states of
France and Germany, America’s bureaucracies appeared stunted,
undistinguished, and strangely impotent.”).
19. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 6 (“‘Regulation,’ as used here, to borrow
a definition from Christopher Foreman, refers to ‘any governmental effort to
control behavior by other entities, including small business firms, subordinate
levels of government, or individuals.’”). See generally ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN
CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION : T HEORY , STRATEGY , AND
PRACTICE (2d ed. 2012).
20. Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375,
377 (2007).
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by legislatures.21 Private rights of action have been created as
integral parts of new regulatory programs, enabling individual
litigants to enforce the regulatory demands.22 In other cases, as
with the tort system, it has arisen from the country’s common law
tradition, but often interacting with statutes which may define
duties or adjust incentives to litigate.23
This system—described as “adversarial legalism”—shifts to
the court system governance issues that in other countries may be
handled through bureaucratic structures.24 This approach vests
private parties, acting through their lawyers and the courts, with
an important regulatory role.25 The courts, in short, are a vital part
21. See Thomas F. Burke, The Rights Revolution Continues: Why New Rights
Are Born (and Old Rights Rarely Die), 33 C ONN. L. REV. 1259, 1259–60 (2001)
(“[T]hough the origins of regulation by litigation are usually traced to avaricious
trial lawyers and ambitious attorneys general, in fact, regulation by litigation has
deep roots in the structure of American government and American political
culture.”).
22. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 3 (“The existence and extent of private
litigation enforcing a statute is to an important degree the product of legislative
choice over questions of statutory design.”).
23. See Stephan Landsman, Juries as Regulators of Last Resort, 55 W M. &
MARY L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2014) (tracing the role of juries as regulators in
common law settings and arguing that new torts, such as insurance bad faith,
empower juries to address regulatory gaps in the modern era); David Zaring,
National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional
Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1038 (2004) (viewing institutional reform
lawsuits as nodes of a national network that develop and spread best practice
standards nationally).
24. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 47 (2003) (“In sum, whereas European polities generally rely on
hierarchically organized national bureaucracies to hold local officials accountable
to national policies, the U.S. Congress mobilized a distinctly American army of
enforcers—a decentralized, ideologically motivated array of private advocacy
groups and lawyers.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and
the Counterrevolution Against Federal Regulation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1496
(2017) (“Research in multiple disciplines has established that the role of litigation
and courts in the creation and implementation of public policy in the United
States has grown dramatically.”); Richard L. Marcus, Reining In the American
Litigator: The New Role of American Judges, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
3, 7 (2003) (“A final feature of the American experience that bears on this overall
picture of the crusading pursuer of right is the distinctive American reliance on
private enforcement of public norms.”). See also Landsman, supra note 23, at 1107
(arguing that court-made torts fill regulatory gaps).
25. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 648–61 (2013) (analyzing the
structure of private enforcement); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private
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of the governance process.26 As one scholar has noted: The United
States more often relies on lawyers, legal threats, and legal
contestation in implementing public policies, compensating
accident victims, striving to hold governmental officials
accountable, and resolving business disputes.27
The role of the courts and litigation in policy making goes
beyond federal programs such as employment discrimination and
civil rights, although these are important and a large source of
federal judicial business.28 In state courts as well as federal courts,
the role of the courts reaches regulation of product safety,
protection of the financial markets, and protection of the public
health.29 As summarized by one leading procedural scholar:
The efforts of public interest attorneys go well beyond the
classic civil rights and legislative reapportionment battles.
Asbestos is held in check by the private bar. Tobacco is cabined
by the private bar. Defective pharmaceuticals such as diet
drugs, Vioxx, and other products are removed from our midst.
Illicit financial and market practices of companies such as
Enron are halted by the private bar. Today, a number of
attempts are underway to hold accountable some of those
responsible for the recent financial crisis. Fewer Americans die
or become incapacitated by defective products or toxic
substances, and important social and economic policies are
enforced because of the work of these lawyers. 30

Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 W M. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1217
(2012) (“[T]here is a decidedly public dimension, both structural and functional,
to private regulation of wrongdoing.”); but see STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN
FARHANG, RIGHTS AND R ETRENCHMENT : T HE C OUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST
FEDERAL LITIGATION 2–3 (2017) (examining conservative counterrevolution
implemented through courts against private enforcement).
26. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 5 (describing litigation “not merely as a
method of solving legal disputes but as a mode of governance”).
27. Id. at 110–11.
28. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that job discrimination lawsuits
are generally one of the largest categories of litigation in federal courts).
29. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court,
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 291 (2013) (illustrating the “tremendous range” of matters
resolved through litigation).
30. Id. at 299–300.
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1. Regulation Through Deterrence
The net of all this is that the American governance and
regulation system relies on litigation in a way not common in other
countries.31 Functions are shifted from bureaucratic agencies to
the courts.32 This works, in theory and practice, because
participants in the American system recognize that they can be
held to account through litigation, and so modify their behavior in
order to avoid legal damages.33
This deterrence function does not, of course, take place with
the mathematical rigor of the simplified economic models, but it
does take place.34 Intermediaries such as corporate compliance
departments and insurance underwriters play a role in translating
legal requirements into behavioral norms.35

31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. For a detailed comparative
discussion in one setting, see Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman,
Perspectives on Policy: Introduction, in REGULATING TOBACCO 3 (Robert L. Rabin
& Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
32. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 3 (explaining that the United States “relies
on adversarial legalism far more than other economically advanced
democracies”).
33. See Lahav, supra note 17, at 1658 (explaining that the regulatory
function of litigation causes “individuals and organizations [to] anticipate or learn
from the results adjudication and adjust their behavior accordingly”); see also
FARHANG, supra note 14, at 8–9
Studies have found, ranging across such policy domains as job
discrimination, sexual harassment, labor, playground safety,
antitrust, and police brutality, that implementation of regulatory
commands through private lawsuits can effectively encourage and
induce compliance behavior by the regulated population, whether they
be private entities or governmental subunits. The findings have
established both “specific deterrence” and “general deterrence” effects,
where specific deterrence refers to the effects of enforcement against a
particular violator on that violator’s future conduct, while general
deterrence refers to effects of visible enforcement efforts in the legal
environment on other would-be violators who have yet to actually be
the targets of enforcement, and hope never to be.
34. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 16 (describing the American court system
as “extremely inefficient”).
35. See id. at 130–31 (explaining how the U.S. tort law system operates as a
“collective responsibility/social insurance model” which dictates to what extent
and by whom victims of harm are compensated).
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2. Litigation as Creating Legal Rules

Litigation provides more than just deterrence.36 In the U.S.,
with its common law tradition, litigation directly leads to new
laws.37 As higher courts decide issues raised in litigation, those
decisions become binding precedent, confining the actions of lower
courts and later editions of the same court.38 As a result, the
development of U.S. legal doctrine depends directly on the flow of
cases.39
3. Compensation in the Place of Social Insurance
Operating without the kind of pervasive governmental health
insurance and welfare net common in some Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) countries, the
U.S. turns to litigation for compensation when individuals are
injured.40 With government benefits comparatively scant,
payments from those who caused the injury help fill the gap.41 This
also represents a governmental interest that is addressed through
litigation rather than other governmental means.42
4. Regulation Through Litigation as More Favorable to Rapid
Innovation
Litigants in the U.S. moan, unsurprisingly, about the burdens
of regulatory litigation, but in doing so pass by the benefits that
36. See Lahav, supra note 17, at 1658 (explaining that litigation is typically
understood as serving more than one function).
37. See id. (describing litigation as “a system for law declaration”).
38. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 3–4 (discussing, for example, how private
lawsuits shaped the legal landscape of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
39. See id. at 4 (noting that legislators deliberately choose to delegate their
lawmaking authority to the courts).
40. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 126, 130 (comparing the U.S. regime for
compensating injured persons with those in the Netherlands and New Zealand).
41. See id. at 126 (describing the process in which a worker harmed by
asbestos can bring a tort suit and obtain money damages for pain and suffering).
42. See id. at 127 (“In the early 1980s Congress considered but failed to
create a fund that would compensate asbestos victims without the need for costly
civil litigation.”).
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accrue from shifting regulation to an ex post facto basis.43
Compared to many other countries, the U.S. imposes lower upfront
barriers to market entry.44 Legal entities such as corporations can
be quickly formed; products can be brought to market with no
regulatory approval in a wide range of settings.45
In other jurisdictions, entry into markets can be more actively
controlled.46 A country might only allow companies to be publicly
listed after approval by a government ministry,47 or might control
private activity through direct intervention by government
bureaucrats.48 The U.S. engages to some degree in this kind of
regulation—notably with regard to drugs and medical
devices—but compared to other countries, it relies much more on
private litigants to bring lawsuits which serve as after-the-fact
regulation when problems arise.49 For example, rather than
43. See Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 382 (highlighting the indispensable
role of private litigation in ex post accountability).
44. See id. at 377 (dubbing the United States as “Exhibit A” in terms of
relaxed market entry).
45. See id. at 376–77 (explaining that when a government removes barrier
to entry, it “is well advised to interfere minimally with privately generated
growth”).
46. See id. at 375 (“Prior to Putin-era reforms, for example, a typical business
in Russia needed to acquire between 300 and 500 different permits before
opening.”).
47. See Chen Yang & Zhi Bin, China, in THE I NITIAL P UBLIC OFFERINGS
LAW REVIEW 24 (David J. Goldschmidt ed., 3d ed. 2019)
IPO listings in China are subject to regulatory approval by the CSRC
[China Railway Signal & Communication Corp.]. Therefore, the
approval system in China differs from the registration system in Hong
Kong, the United States and other capital markets. The CSRC
determines whether a prospective issuer provided accurate and
adequate disclosure in accordance with listing requirements. In
practice, applicants may face long waiting periods (sometimes two to
three years or even more), due to administrative backlog and repeated
requests for information.
48. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 6–7 (describing the Weberian ideal of the
modern state, which measures state capacity by bureaucratic size and
involvement, as the traditional understanding of a “strong state”).
49. See Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 382 (“[T]he idea that a sufficient level
of state or federal regulation could effectively displace private litigation is almost
inconceivable.”); Landsman, supra note 23, at 1062–64 (explaining how litigation
addresses regulatory gaps caused by regulatory capture or political influence);
Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. C HI . L.J. 669, 674–75 (2014) (noting
regulatory value of private securities litigation).

108

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (2020)

requiring active up or down approval before a company can go
public or a potentially unsafe product can be sold, enforcement is
substantially shifted to the courts if and when a problem arises.50
In order to make this practical, private litigants are given
investigatory and factual exploration powers that in other
countries are given only to government agencies.51 This approach
calculates that companies faced with the cost of such suits will
engage in voluntary self-regulation, and so be deterred from
unreasonably dangerous activities.52
This preference for after-the-fact regulation provides many
significant advantages in today’s economy.53 Innovation can
proceed at the speed of the most innovative businesses, rather than
being held to the pace of government bureaucracies.54 To enter a
market costs less, given the absence of required prior approvals,
thus allowing the entry of innovators who might be kept out of the

50. See Patrick Luff, Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 64
RUTGERS L. R EV. 73, 75–76 (2011) (discussing the use of regulatory
litigation —both statutory and litigant driven—to fill regulatory gaps).
51. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 15 (explaining that the U.S. system
deprives the government “of direct controls over the economy that, for good or for
ill, many governments elsewhere in the world employ”).
52. See Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 379–81 (“The ex post regulatory model
is premised on the idea that parties should be able to internalize the risk of
liability—perhaps even for punitive damages—and regulate themselves
accordingly.”).
53. See Burbank, Farhang, & Kritzer, supra note 25, at 662
On the positive side of the ledger, relative to administrative
implementation, private enforcement regimes can: (1) multiply
resources devoted to prosecuting enforcement actions; (2) shift the
costs of regulation off of governmental budgets and onto the private
sector; (3) take advantage of private information to detect violations;
(4) encourage legal and policy innovation; (5) emit a clear and
consistent signal that violations will be prosecuted, providing
insurance against the risk that a system of administrative
implementation will be subverted; (6) limit the need for direct and
visible intervention by the bureaucracy in the economy and society;
and (7) facilitate participatory and democratic governance.
See also Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107
(2005) (discussing three salient advantages of private enforcement).
54. See Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 25, at 664 (reasoning that
private enforcement regimes encourage legal innovation because private litigants
“are more likely to press for innovations in legal theories and strategies”).
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market by the costs of entry in other systems.55 Time to market
shrinks to the extent governmental processes are not part of the
timeline, which can allow companies to seize first mover
advantage.56 After-the-fact regulation can even diminish
corruption, by removing gatekeepers who might demand payoffs
before a market is opened.57
Effective after-the-fact regulation does require, however, that
litigation works as a check on behavior.58 If laws are not enforced
or are only sporadically enforced through litigation, the regulatory
grip is reduced.59 Personal jurisdiction thus can play a critical role
in making sure that regulation through courts is effective.
B. After-the-Fact Regulation of Aliens in The Age of Globalization
In a globalized world, after-the-fact regulation can only be
effective if companies selling into or otherwise impacting the U.S.
can be held effectively to account through litigation. Narrow
jurisdictional rules reduce the grip of the U.S. regulatory system
on those whose behavior is sought to be regulated. This is
aggravated when jurisdictional rules are readily manipulated—as
when the analysis looks not to effects or foreseeable consequences,
but to evidence of the defendant’s state of mind with regard to the
forum at some time before the litigation arises. Defendants’ intent
on avoiding exposure can endeavor to build a “purposeful
availment” narrative that distances them from responsibility in
the U.S., while benefiting fully from the U.S. market.60
55. See id. at 663 (noting that private enforcement regimes impose lower
costs because legislators can implement policy at a lesser cost than with
administrative implementation).
56. See Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 385 (showing how a private
enforcement regime makes it easier to bring a product to market and makes the
U.S an attractive place to do business).
57. See id. at 375 (noting that “heavier regulation of entry is generally
associated with greater corruption”).
58. See Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 25, at 667 (showing how
private enforcement regimes can lead to fragmented and incoherent policy).
59. See id. at 669 (“The legislative and executive branches have less
continuing control over policy when private enforcement is relied on for
implementation . . . .”).
60. See Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country Corporate
Defendants— Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REV. 431, 433 (1984)
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On the other hand, there are clear costs to unbridled
regulatory reach. Excessive or “exorbitant” claims of power can
cause conflict with other nations.61 In addition, opening the doors
too widely can burden the U.S. courts with litigation in which the
U.S. has little stake or interest.
In recent years, the scope of U.S. personal jurisdiction has
shrunk.62 While eliminating bases for legitimate concerns about
exorbitant jurisdiction, it also raises concerns about whether U.S.
jurisdiction remains broad enough to allow effective regulation to
protect U.S. consumers and markets.63
C. The Shrinking Reach of U.S. Personal Jurisdiction
Not so long ago, the reach of U.S. personal jurisdiction was
extremely broad, leading to a fair concern that the U.S. suffered
from “exorbitant jurisdiction” that overreached.64 In recent years,
however, the scope of U.S. personal jurisdiction against both
domestic and foreign defendants has been dramatically
narrowed.65 Coinciding with this, but not entirely driving it, has
been a renewed emphasis on limits on state power, with concerns
expressed by some justices that states not overstep and interfere
(noting the possibility that foreign country defendant could structure activities to
avoid jurisdiction through devices such as channeling all sales through local
subsidiary or shipping F.O.B. foreign location); Janice Toran, Federalism,
Personal Jurisdiction, and Aliens, 58 TUL . L. REV. 758, 773 (1984) (“[A]lien
businesses may be able to structure their commercial dealings in the United Sates
to avoid establishing sufficient contacts with any one state and thus to avoid
jurisdiction in this country.”).
61. See Kevin M. Clermont & John R. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58
ME. L. REV. 473, 476 (explaining that identifying jurisdiction as exorbitant is “to
condemn it as inappropriate from an international standpoint”).
62. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal
Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499, 505 (2018) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
personal jurisdiction cases since 2011 constitute a “stealth” narrowing of personal
jurisdiction).
63. Personal jurisdiction is just one doctrine that has changed in a way that
limits U.S. regulatory reach. See generally Pamela Bookman, Litigation
Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015).
64. See generally Clermont & Palmer, supra note 61.
65. See Hoffheimer, supra note 62, at 502–03 (discussing how recent
restrictions on jurisdiction have made it difficult for plaintiffs to find available
courts).
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with other states.66 Interestingly, even though some of the
defendants in the landmark cases have been from outside the U.S.,
the Court has seemed to draw no operative distinction between
domestic and foreign defendants.67 The net result has moved the
U.S. to a place where its jurisdictional scope is narrower, not
broader, than other countries, which is of special concern because
the U.S. delegates so much more regulatory enforcement and law
creation to its court system.68
1. The Retreat from Exorbitant Jurisdiction
Recent years have seen dramatic limitations on the scope of
U.S. personal jurisdiction.69 Most clearly with regard to disputes
that have no relation to the forum, but also to those with some
connection to the forum, the Supreme Court has rolled back
jurisdictional reach.70
The rollback has not been complete, and in some limited ways
the reach of U.S. courts goes beyond international norms.71 For
example, the U.S. allows “tag” jurisdiction based on nothing more
than the voluntary bodily presence of a human being in a
jurisdiction, even if the dispute is otherwise utterly unrelated to
the forum.72 The U.S. will also find consent to personal jurisdiction
based on boilerplate forum selection clauses in form contracts of
66. See infra Part III.
67. See id. (“[T]he assumption seems to be that, so long as subject matter
jurisdiction is present, alien defendants may be sued in the same manner as
citizens in both state and federal courts.”).
68. See Hoffheimer, supra note 62, at 505 (arguing that the Court has
exhibited “radical” changes in the area of personal jurisdiction).
69. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing recent restrictions
on personal jurisdiction).
70. See Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781
(2017) (rejecting the California Supreme Court’s “sliding scale approach” for
specific jurisdiction and explaining that “a defendant’s general connections with
the forum are not enough” for specific jurisdiction).
71. See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 61, at 477 (“[C]ourts in the United
States shock the world by asserting jurisdiction over a defendant based merely on
the defendant’s transient physical presence.”).
72. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (stating
that personal jurisdiction can be established by service on a human being
voluntarily present in the jurisdiction, despite a lack of minimum contacts).
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adhesion, even when it seems certain that the term was not
actively negotiated and most likely not actually read.73
The practical, commercial scope of these remaining exceptions
to high dollar, financially significant corporate settings is
somewhat limited, however. Jurisdiction based on bodily presence
does not apply to corporate defendants.74 Unread boilerplate
consent clauses can apply to corporate defendants, but it seems
less likely that consent will be imposed, unread, on corporations
negotiating a significant transaction than on consumers making
an online purchase.75
a. The Narrowing of Dispute-Blind “General” Jurisdiction
By way of contrast, the narrowing of dispute-blind “general
jurisdiction” promises to have an enormous practical impact. Most
U.S. personal jurisdiction relies on a “minimum contacts” test,
which asks whether the defendant’s contacts with the jurisdiction
are sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be asserted consistent with
due process concerns.76 The contacts can be so systematic and
continuous as to give rise to so-called “general jurisdiction,”77
which allows assertion of personal jurisdiction against a corporate
defendant even for disputes unrelated to the forum.78 More limited
73. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596 (1991)
(determining consent to exclusive forum in a form contract of adhesion upheld);
see generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE : THE F INE P RINT , VANISHING
RIGHTS , AND THE R ULE OF L AW 135–38 (2013).
74. See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015) (holding that personal jurisdiction cannot be
obtained by service on an officer of a corporation who is present in the jurisdiction
without minimum contacts for the corporation).
75. See RADIN, supra note 73, at 135 (noting that forum selection clauses in
boilerplate are limited by the U.S. constitutional guarantee of due process).
76. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, have certain minimum
contacts with it . . . .”); see generally WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1067 (4th ed.).
77. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924
(2011) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place,
one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”).
78. See id. at 919 (stating that for general jurisdiction, a court may hear any
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contacts can give rise to so-called “specific jurisdiction,” which
looks only to contacts related to the dispute at bar.79
Not so long ago, many and probably most U.S. lawyers
understood general jurisdiction to lie when a party had any
substantial “systematic and continuous” contacts with the forum
state.80 While the Supreme Court had provided little guidance on
what might provide adequate contacts in this setting, litigants and
judges apparently understood the test to be looking for exactly
what the terms imply—systematic and continuous operations
within the state.81 Because many large corporations have
systematic and continuous operations at some level in many
jurisdictions, the assertion of a personal jurisdiction defense by
large, domestic companies was not often successfully asserted.82
Under the understanding that governed for decades, a company
that had operated a large factory in the forum state, or that
maintained multiple offices that engaged in significant amounts of
business, might be understood to be subject to general personal
jurisdiction.83
The practical impact of such a broad understanding was
significant. General jurisdiction provides U.S. personal
jurisdiction (and hence often a forum) for any dispute, worldwide,
and all claims against the corporation).
79. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, at § 1067.5.
80. See Judy M. Cornett & Michael M. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 101, 104 (2015) (“Despite the Court’s assurance that its decisions are
guided by tradition, Daimler departs from settled law under which corporations
have been subject to jurisdiction for all claims in states where they maintained a
sufficient permanent presence or engaged in a comparable substantial level of
business.”).
81. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U.L.
REV. 1, 24 (2018) (“Prior to Goodyear, the common understanding was that
companies doing substantial business in all fifty states—Daimler, Goodyear,
Walmart, and the like—would have been subject to general jurisdiction in every
state.”).
82. Often, it was not tried because of the seeming futility. See Cassandra
Burke Robertson, Personal Jurisdiction in Legal Malpractice Litigation, 6 ST .
MARY’S J. LEGAL M AL . & ETHICS 2, 15 (2016) (noting that under continuous and
systematic standard many defendants did not challenge jurisdiction).
83. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 6, at 1218–19 (“The test distilled from
these two cases (and ‘taught to generations of first-year law students’) was that
general jurisdiction could be based on ‘continuous and systematic general
business contacts.’”).
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where general jurisdiction can be established in the U.S.84 Even for
domestic companies, general jurisdiction offers additional forum
shopping opportunities, with more chances to find a locale hostile
to the defendant.85 With globalization and the concentration of
economic wealth in major corporations, a situation arose where
many companies, domestic and foreign, engaged in systematic and
continuous contacts in many locations, if not almost everywhere.86
Because general jurisdiction requires no connection to the dispute
itself, this meant for many companies, personal jurisdiction for
disputes worldwide could be had in any number of U.S. locations.87
The potential impact of such a broad understanding of general
jurisdiction was to put pressure on the U.S. to become a default
forum for any dispute, arising anywhere, that involved a defendant
doing regular systematic and continuous business in the U.S.88
While other doctrines such as forum non conveniens exist to limit
the scope of U.S. judicial power in a given case,89 and statutes such
as the Alien Tort Claims Act90 can be interpreted to limit statutory
reach,91 even deciding whether to entertain such cases was a
84. See Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780
(2017) (“A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that
defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different
State.” (emphasis in original)).
85. See Walter W. Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of
General Jurisdiction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2004) (explaining that
general jurisdiction offers plaintiffs the opportunity to forum shop to “capture the
most favorable substantive law or statute of limitations”).
86. See Daimler AG v. Bauman 571 U.S. 117, 156 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (reasoning that today’s global economy has caused large corporations
to feel “essentially at home” in multiple States).
87. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction,
2001 U. CHI . LEGAL F. 141, 159 (2001) (“The Supreme Court case law, the
Restatements and the academic literature largely agree that foreign corporations
doing a sufficient volume of business are subject to general in personam
jurisdiction even though they are neither incorporated nor have their principal
place of business within the forum state.”).
88. See Heiser, supra note 85, at 1037 (showing how general jurisdiction is
controversial for international litigation where foreign defendants with contacts
in the United States “fear they will be forced into a court in the United States”).
89. See id. at 1040–42 (discussing application of reasonableness branch of
minimum contacts and forum non conveniens as factors limiting the reach of
general jurisdiction).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).
91. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013)
(applying a presumption against extraterritorial application).
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potentially burdensome business for U.S. courts to be in. What’s
more, the broad assertion of judicial power, subject only to
prudential narrowing doctrines, put the U.S. in an exceptional
position versus other sovereign nations, whose conceptions of
jurisdiction generally were narrower than entertaining all claims,
worldwide, against any company doing regular and substantial
business in a jurisdiction.92
The potential breadth of general jurisdiction was illustrated
by the Court’s even choosing to hear and analyze at length the
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall93 case rather
than disposing of it by summary reversal. In this case, it is not
remarkable that the court found that one trip to Texas by a foreign
corporation’s chief executive officer, the acceptance of checks
drawn on a Texas bank, the purchase of a helicopter and
equipment from a Texas manufacturer, and related training trips
did not rise to the level of systematic and continuous contacts
required to create dispute blind personal jurisdiction for claims
arising anywhere.94 Rather, what is remarkable is that the Court
found it necessary to discuss for ten pages in the U.S. reports how
close to the lines this scanty conduct was. Had the Court found
general jurisdiction, similarly light contacts would have provided
personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations on a dispute-blind
basis for claims unrelated to those U.S. activities.
In light of lower courts’ understanding of general jurisdiction
at the time, however, Helicopteros was not as exceptional as it
seemed in the post-Daimler era. Lower courts at that time had
found general jurisdiction where companies had made multiple
sales of rare coins to customers in the state,95 used the highways
92. This unusual breadth posed difficulties when an effort was made to reach
an international treaty on recognizing judgments, which necessarily involved
issues of appropriate jurisdiction. See Heiser, supra note 85, at 1037–38 (arguing
that general jurisdiction became a major obstacle in negotiating treaty).
93. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
94. See id. at 418 (concluding that the defendant’s minimum contacts with
the State did not allow the State court to assert personal jurisdiction for a claim
not arising within that State).
95. See Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 629, 633 (N.C. 1977)
(finding jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant for sales to a then resident of
South Carolina where it had solicited business in North Carolina and made
$50,000 in sales); Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business With
Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI . LEGAL F. 171, 176 (2001) (“Our courts
have exercised general jurisdiction over defendants with no physical presence in
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of the state in connection with a trucking business,96 operated a
seven-employee office and had another employee who spent much
of his working time in the state (all on activities unrelated to the
claim),97 and where a rock promoter had run rock concerts in the
state.98 Such decisions, which were not far outside the mainstream,
went far toward making the U.S. at least jurisdictionally open to
all kinds of claims worldwide.99
The Court backed away from this problem by effectively
rewriting the scope of general jurisdiction. Somewhat obscurely in
Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown,100 and then very
explicitly in Daimler AG v. Bauman,101 the Court made clear that
general jurisdiction was much narrower than the previous
understanding. Rather than lying wherever systematic and
continuous activities can be found, the Court explained, general
jurisdiction lies only when a defendant can be said to be “at home”
in the jurisdiction.102 The Court identified two situations where
companies generally were at home.103 One was the state of
incorporation, under whose laws the company’s existence
the forum—whose only contacts are purchases from forum sellers, sales to forum
customers through third parties, or even purchases by web site or mail
order—sometimes using this same reciprocal benefits rationale.”).
96. See Carter v. Massey, 436 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D. Md. 1977) (asserting
personal jurisdiction in Maryland over trucking company for accident in Delaware
unrelated to any Maryland activities because the company, after the accident, had
done trucking business in Maryland).
97. See St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Gitchoff, 369 N.E.2d 52, 53 (Ill. 1977) (discussing
how defendant has a seven employees sales office plus one logistics employee who
often worked in Illinois).
98. See North Dakota v. Newberger, 613 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Mont. 1980)
(allowing suit in Montana for contract breach in North Dakota because California
based concert promoter had held concerts in Montana). For more examples, see
Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
633 – 36 (1988).
99. As might be expected, such potentially broad assertions of jurisdiction
were controversial internationally. See Heiser, supra note 85, at 1036 (“General
jurisdiction [pre-Daimler] is particularly controversial in international litigation
involving foreign defendants who do business in the United States.”).
100. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
101. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
102. See id. at 139 (concluding that the general jurisdiction did not exist
where the defendant was not at home in California).
103. See id. (explaining the conditions for general jurisdiction of a corporate
defendant).
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derives.104 The second was the state where the company has its
principal place of business.105
The narrowing of the jurisdictional reach was made clear
through the facts in Daimler, where no attempt had been made in
the lower courts or at the Court itself to vigorously argue that
general jurisdiction did not lie in California for Daimler’s U.S.
subsidiary.106 Mercedes Benz automobiles have been a fixture in
California virtually since the invention of the automobile, and
various Daimler subsidiaries had maintained for generations
extensive operations supporting substantial sales.107 Under the
prior understanding of general jurisdiction, there is little question
that the U.S. subsidiary would have qualified for general
jurisdiction. Under Daimler, however, because neither its
headquarters nor principal place of business were there, those
actions did not suffice to create general jurisdiction even against
the subsidiary.108 The Court left open the possibility of other
settings for general jurisdiction, but the facts of Daimler make
clear that the other settings will involve unusual if not unique
circumstances.109
Daimler has enormous practical impact. Prior to Goodyear and
Daimler, the operating assumption of many lawyers was that
personal jurisdiction, at least, would lie in any U.S. setting where
the defendant had ongoing and significant operations—and
perhaps even where the activities, like those in Helicopteros, were
104. See id. (noting that the defendants, Daimler and MBUSA, were not
incorporated in California).
105. See id. (stating the defendant did not have its principal place of business
in California and was therefore not amenable to suit there). While Daimler
represented a shift within U.S. law, placing general jurisdiction where a
defendant has its domicile has ancient roots, going back at least to Justinian’s
code. See Juenger, supra note 87, at 143 (citing Justinian’s Code, cod 3.19.3,
3.13.2).
106. See Daimler AG v. Bauman 571 U.S. 117, 143 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (discussing how the defendant conceded that the California courts
could exercise general jurisdiction over its U.S. subsidiary).
107. See id. at 123 (stating that the defendant “is the largest supplier of
luxury vehicles to the California market”).
108. See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text (discussing the
requirements for general jurisdiction over a corporation).
109. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 (reasoning that general jurisdiction could
exist where the corporation’s contacts with a State are so substantial that it is
essentially at home).
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much slimmer. Today, as a practical matter, general jurisdiction is
likely to be found only in two locations—in the state under whose
law a corporation is created, and in the state where it maintains
its headquarters.110
In many cases—and in all cases involving foreign
defendants—this shifts the inquiry away from whether a
corporation maintains a regular presence in a state to whether
specific contacts related to the litigation can be found.111 In many
garden variety settings, a different result can be obtained. For
example, prior to Daimler, personal jurisdiction could be expected
to lie against any bank conducting regular business in financial
centers such as New York, enabling both the attachment of assets
and the initiation of discovery.112 After Daimler, general
jurisdiction lies only in the state of incorporation and the principal
place of business.113 For an alien, neither of those locations will be
within the U.S., and so general jurisdiction will never apply.114
The Gucci litigation provides a concrete example of where this
could happen.115 In Gucci, the claim was that a Chinese company
110. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text (discussing the
requirements for general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant).
111. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (“[T]he relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation . . . became the central concern
of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”).
112. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“[T]here have
been instances in which continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”).
113. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text (discussing general
jurisdiction of a corporate defendant under Daimler).
114. See Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, A
Shifting Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction, Transnational Litigation, and the
Problem of Nonparties, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643, 646 (2015) (addressing
the importance of the issue in transnational litigation and arguing for a broader
specific jurisdiction analysis against nonparties such as foreign banks in such
situations, balanced with comity concerns with regard to interests of the foreign
jurisdiction).
115. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2011 WL
6156936, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) (arguing that bank account information
in China could be subpoenaed because the bank has United States branches that
transfer money between branches in New York and China); see also Gucci Am.,
Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2012 WL 5992142, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
15, 2012) (concluding that the Bank of China was held in civil contempt for failing
to produce documents relating to bank accounts in China following a court order
to do so).
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was engaged in trademark violations that were enabled by the
bank’s processing of payments.116 Finding general jurisdiction,
prior to Daimler, the district court required the Bank of China to
produce banking records of the alleged infringer so as to reveal the
scope of income potentially related to the trademark violations.117
The District Court imposed heavy daily cash fines to ensure
compliance, despite claims that compliance would violate Chinese
law.118
On appeal, the Second Circuit looked to Daimler, and found
that general jurisdiction did not exist.119 It then remanded for a
determination of whether specific jurisdiction could be
demonstrated.120 On remand, the District Court found specific
jurisdiction did lie, but the nature of the inquiry was different and
depended on the specific facts.121 On similar facts involving two
banks doing regular business in the local jurisdiction, the Seventh
Circuit found that in the absence of Iranian assets in the
jurisdiction neither general nor personal jurisdiction could be
established so as to enforce a subpoena that would require the
banks to reveal whether and where they held Iranian
assets—perhaps a different result than would have been likely
before Daimler.122
It is perhaps worth noting that a case such as Gucci in the
post-Daimler era leaves plaintiffs with a harder task establishing
personal jurisdiction than they would have had either in the
116. See Gucci, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1 (alleging that defendants were
offering counterfeit versions of plaintiff’s products on the internet).
117. See id. at *13 (ordering the defendant to produce all information
requested by the subpoena).
118. See Gucci, 2012 WL 5992142, at *7 (arguing that a party could still be
held in contempt even if compliance could result in a violation of foreign law).
119. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d. Cir. 2014)
(concluding that the district court may not exercise general personal jurisdiction
over the defendant based on Daimler).
120. See id. at 138 (stating that the district court should develop a record
sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction).
121. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 135 F. Supp. 3d 87, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(concluding that exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was
reasonable and comported with due process).
122. See Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 852 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir.
2017) (finding that specific jurisdiction did not lie where banks in Chicago did not
hold any assets of the Iranian government).
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Pennoyer123 era or in most of the International Shoe124 era.125
Under Pennoyer, quasi in rem jurisdiction could easily have been
established over a bank with substantial assets in the
jurisdiction,126 as well perhaps as “presence” through a “doing
business” analysis of the kind that prevailed before International
Shoe.127 After Shaffer v. Heitner,128 however, quasi in rem
jurisdiction is functionally unavailable where there are no
minimum contacts.
After Daimler, general jurisdiction no longer provides a
justification for claiming that the U.S. exercises exorbitant
jurisdiction. With limited general jurisdiction and with a specific
jurisdiction analysis that is more narrow than most other nations
employ, the U.S. seems as narrow, if not more narrow, in its
jurisdictional assertions than most other nations.129
b. The Potential Narrowing of Specific Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction is not the whole story, moreover. The
court, less definitively, has also seemed to narrow the scope of
specific jurisdiction, although fractured and fact bound holdings
make the outcome less clear. For decades, the touchstone for
specific, or dispute-related, personal jurisdiction has been whether
123. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
124. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
125. It has been argued that minimum contacts analysis in general as
currently applied gives states less ability to bring in out-of-state defendants than
Pennoyer’s territorial model. See Cody J. Jacobs, In Defense of Territorial
Jurisdiction, 85 U. CHI . L. REV. 1589, 1595 (2018) (“Second, I show that the
post-Shoe era has not expanded the reach of personal jurisdiction and, instead,
has contracted state power into a husk of what would have been available before
Shoe.”).
126. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 227–28 (1905) (holding that the
presence of intangible financial interest in state sufficient to establish quasi in
rem jurisdiction).
127. See Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (“A
foreign corporation is amenable to process . . . if it is doing business within the
state in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is
present there.”).
128. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
129. For a discussion of comparative jurisdictional regimes, see generally
CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2015).
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the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of a connection with the
forum state.130 Situations where a connection with the forum were
imposed upon the defendant are not enough;131 even when it is
foreseeable that a company’s defective product might have ended
up in the forum, courts have demanded more.132
The J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro133 case illustrates this
narrowing.134 In Nicastro, the plaintiff was injured by an industrial
metal shredding machine at his workplace in New Jersey.135 No
one disputed that New Jersey had an interest in regulating the
safety of industrial machinery in its state, nor that New Jersey has
130. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“In this case,
petitioners are primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally
directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on that
basis.”); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (concluding
personal jurisdiction existed where activities were purposefully directed at the
state); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985) (finding that the
defendant purposefully availed himself of benefits of state’s laws).
131. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality
and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
132. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)
(noting that foreseeability “alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause”).
133. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
134. The Nicastro opinion has been much criticized by commentators. See,
e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence
of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (calling
the decision a “disaster”); Wendy Collins, What’s Sovereignty Got to Do with It?
Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729,
729 (2012) (“[M]ay set a new low . . . .”); John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in
a Global World: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 W ASH. L. REV . 1707, 1729 (2013) (“[T]he worst
result in any personal jurisdiction case decided by the Supreme Court in the
modern era.”); Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s
Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341,
345 (2012) (“[E]xacerbated rather than ameliorated the doctrinal
confusion . . . .”); John T. Parry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the
Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro,
16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827, 841 (2012) (“[C]ompounds . . . uncertainty . . . .”).
135. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 878 (discussing how plaintiff filed a products
liability suit for a machine produced by the defendant in England).
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an interest in seeing that its citizen was able to obtain
compensation for an industry.136 Equally, it was a given that the
manufacturer of the machine actively sought to sell machinery
throughout the U.S. market, which includes New Jersey.137
Nonetheless, personal jurisdiction was found lacking.138
A plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy looked at the forum
specific contacts of the defendant.139 The defendant, J. McIntyre
Machinery Co., had engaged in a long-term course of action in
which it marketed its products to the U.S. as a whole.140 In
connection with that, it had contracted with an affiliated U.S.
company to handle sales in the U.S., advertised, attended trade
shows, and otherwise sought to make sales in the U.S. market.141
None of those activities, so far as is clear from the record, took
place in the forum state of New Jersey, however.142 What’s more,
while J. McIntyre had had some success in selling to the US, the
limited market for large metal shredders left it without large
numbers of sales in New Jersey—it was possible that the machine
that caused the injury was the only one in the state, and at most
one of no more than four.143
On these facts, Justice Kennedy and the plurality found
evidence that New Jersey specifically had been targeted to be
lacking, and found that to be a fatal flaw for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction within New Jersey.144 Because, in Kennedy’s
136. See id. at 887 (noting that the interest of New Jersey in protecting its
citizens from defective products was strong, but jurisdiction was restrained by
due process).
137. See id. at 878 (stating that an independent company had agreed to sell
the defendant’s machines in the United States).
138. See id. at 887 (concluding that the defendant did not intend to “invoke or
benefit” from the protection of New Jersey laws and that exercising jurisdiction
would violate due process).
139. See id. at 886 (focusing on defendant’s sales in the United States,
attendance of trade shows in the United States, and presence of defendant’s
machines in New Jersey).
140. See id. at 879 (noting that the defendant’s U.S. distributor advertised the
defendant’s machines in the United States at the direction of the defendant).
141. See id. at 886 (discussing the defendant’s contacts with the forum).
142. See id. (demonstrating the lack of contacts that the defendant had with
New Jersey).
143. See id. (noting that the defendant neither advertised, nor sent employees
to New Jersey).
144. See id. at 887 (“At no time did petitioner engage in an any activities in
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view, personal jurisdiction requires a “forum by forum” analysis,145
and because there was no evidence in the record that New Jersey
was targeted individually as opposed to as part of a whole, personal
jurisdiction did not lie.146
Respondent has not established that J. McIntyre engaged in
conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey. Recall that
respondent’s claim of jurisdiction centers on three facts: The
distributor agreed to sell J. McIntyre’s machines in the United
States; J. McIntyre officials attended trade shows in several
States but not in New Jersey; and up to four machines ended up
in New Jersey. The British manufacturer had no office in New
Jersey; it neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and it
neither advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State.
Indeed, after discovery the trial court found that the “defendant
does not have a single contact with New Jersey short of the
machine in question ending up in this state.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 130a. These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S.
market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully
availed itself of the New Jersey market. 147

Justice Kennedy’s analysis suggests a roadmap for
defendants—especially foreign defendants—to avoid personal
jurisdiction. Avoiding contacts with any one state might suffice to
defeat personal jurisdiction anywhere. Indeed, the simple
expedient of appointing a nationwide distributor might be enough
to create a barrier to personal jurisdiction.148

New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of its
laws.”).
145. Id. at 884.
146. See id. (“The question is whether a defendant has followed a course of
conduct directed at the society or economy existing with the jurisdiction of a given
sovereign . . . .”).
147. Id. at 886.
148. See Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 I OWA
L. REV. 1163, 1201–02 (2013)
Until J. McIntyre, no one would have supposed that the German
manufacturer of the Robinsons’ allegedly defective Audi could have
escaped jurisdiction in Oklahoma by giving an importer the exclusive
right to distribute Audi automobiles throughout the United States. Yet
Justice Kennedy’s opinion implicitly suggests that unless Audi
specifically targeted Oklahoma in its marketing, the Oklahoma courts
might not have jurisdiction, no matter how many Audis were sold in
the United States.

124

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (2020)

In a robust dissent, Justice Ginsburg proposed quite a
different approach. Noting that New Jersey had a legitimate
interest in addressing injuries to its citizen, and in regulating the
safety of industrial products within its borders, she began with the
recognition that New Jersey was neither a random nor a detached
forum for the litigation.149 In terms of targeting, she looked to the
national targeting, and was content that sales to New Jersey were
an included and natural component of that broader targeting
effort.150
Justice Ginsburg also noted that the jurisdiction New Jersey
sought to exercise was not, under international norms, excessive
or extravagant:
The Court’s judgment also puts United States plaintiffs at a
disadvantage in comparison to similarly situated complainants
elsewhere in the world. Of particular note, within the European
Union, in which the United Kingdom is a participant, the
jurisdiction New Jersey would have exercised is not at all
exceptional. The European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments provides for the
exercise of specific jurisdiction “in matters relating to tort ... in
the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.”
Council Reg. 44/2001, Art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L.12) 4. The European
Court of Justice has interpreted this prescription to authorize
jurisdiction either where the harmful act occurred or at the
place of injury. See Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de
Potasse d’Alsace S. A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1748–1749.151

The controlling opinion in the case was a concurrence by
Justice Breyer, in which Justice Alito joined. Seemingly
deliberately fact bound, the concurrence looked at the few sales
made into New Jersey, and found it below the standard of ongoing

149. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 894–98 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the instances of purposeful contact with
United States by the defendant to promote sales of its product). As we will see
infra, in many other nations the presence of an injured national within the forum
combined with marketing that foreseeably and directly led to the presence of the
allegedly defective product in the forum would be sufficient for an exercise of
jurisdiction.
150. See id. at 898 (reasoning that defendant’s regular attendance of
conventions and exhibitions in the United States expressed an intent to target
customers anywhere in the country).
151. Id. at 909.
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connection that had been found sufficient in prior cases.152 The
concurrence, however, posited a broad range of different
circumstances that might lead to different concerns and different
results, and argued for more case development before hard and fast
rules of either the kind proposed by Kennedy or urged by Ginsburg
were adopted.153
Nicastro, while split and confusing, made clear that at least a
substantial portion of the Court would insist on state specific
targeting, even by foreign corporations marketing to the U.S. as a
whole.154 If adopted by a majority, this would further restrict the
availability of specific jurisdiction for all defendants. The special
impact state by state targeting has on foreign defendants requires
a look.
2. The Not-So-Special Case of International Defendants
The Court has paid surprisingly little heed to the issue of
whether defendants from outside the United States should be
treated differently from domestic defendants when assessing
personal jurisdiction.155 This reticence to engage the issue has
152. See id. at 889 (Breyer, J., concurring) (showing that the facts presented
demonstrate “no ‘regular flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey”).
153. See id. at 889–90 (referencing Justice Ginsburg’s opinion to show that
other facts could have established jurisdiction). For an argument that lower
courts have not chosen to follow Kennedy’s plurality but apply an analysis closer
to the state court that was reversed, see Frank Deale, J. McIntyre and the Global
Stream of Commerce, 16 CUNY L. REV. 269, 302 (2013) (“[W]hat is especially
noteworthy is the infrequency with which courts follow the Kennedy plurality in
circumstances where doing so will require a plaintiff injured in the United States
to institute litigation in a foreign jurisdiction.”). This survey of lower court cases
took place before Bristol-Myers reaffirmed the state sovereignty language of
Kennedy’s opinion, and in any event the freedom of lower courts to take this
approach depends, of course, on which tack the Supreme Court takes in future
rulings that may generate a majority. See also Jack B. Harrison, Here and There
and Back Again: Drowning in the Stream of Commerce, 44 STETSON L. R EV. 1,
29–39 (2014) (analyzing lower court applications of Nicastro).
154. See supra notes 133–152 and accompanying text (discussing the split
opinions of the justices in Nicastro).
155. See Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the International Order
Begins: Interpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of
a Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61
ALB. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (1998) (“[T]he Court has never articulated a discrete
approach to international jurisdiction.”). But see Austen Parrish, Personal
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come despite a substantial body of scholarship that engages the
issue, and has proposed several justifications for treating alien
defendants differently,156 and that even questions whether foreign
Jurisdiction: The Transnational Difference, 59 VA. J. INT ’L L. 97, 100 (2019)
(arguing that the recent cases involving international defendants should be
understood as involving special issues because of the international element and
that their relevance to domestic cases should not be overstated).
156. See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International
Cases, 17 GA. J. I NT ’L & COMP . L. 1, 43 (1987) (“In state law international cases,
the Due Process Clause should require consideration of foreign defendants’
national contacts [and] their contacts with the forum state. In federal question
cases, a pure national contacts test, looking solely to the defendant’s contacts with
the United States as a whole, should be used.”); Robert C. Casad, Personal
Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1592 (1992)
(arguing for national contacts test for aliens in state and federal courts if certain
protections to assure fairness were met); Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane,
The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien
Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 799–800 (1988) (arguing for national contacts
approach to alien defendants in state and federal courts); Dodge & Dodson, supra
note 6 (arguing for national contacts approach for aliens in state and federal
court); Robin J. Effron, Solving the Nonresident Alien Due Process Paradox in
Personal Jurisdiction, 116 MLR O NLINE 123, 129–30 (2018) (suggesting a
national contacts test for both state and federal cases); Graham C. Lilly,
Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85 (1983)
(arguing for national contacts approach to alien defendants in federal court);
Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that due
process does not apply to alien defendants and hence national contacts can be
aggregated); Bradley W. Paulson, Personal Jurisdiction over Aliens: Unraveling
Entangled Case Law, 13 HOUS . J. I NT ’L L. 117 (1990) (arguing for amendment to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide national aggregation of minimum
contacts for alien defendants); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and
“Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal
Jurisdiction, 98 NW. L. REV. 455, 470 (2004) (arguing that for aliens “it is
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment for U.S. courts to assert personal
jurisdiction solely on the basis of effects in the U.S., without any requirement of
‘purposeful availment’”); Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear
Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction
in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. R EV. 113, 139
(arguing that, in both federal and state court, “premising a finding of jurisdiction
by aggregating the contacts of the foreign defendant with the U.S. resulting from
its participation in a distribution system is inherently fair and reasonable”);
Toran, supra note 60, at 770–88 (arguing for national contacts approach to alien
defendants); see also Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization:
The Case of Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 54 W M. & MARY L. REV. 1489,
1490 (2013) (arguing for allowing personal jurisdiction when the defendant has
received constitutionally adequate notice, the state has a “constitutionally
sufficient” interest in applying its law or resolving a dispute involving its
domiciliaries, and policies of other nations are considered and would not be
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defendants are entitled to any Due Process protections.157
There are two differences implicit in the Court’s cases to date.
First, and perhaps most importantly, is the change effected by the
restriction of general jurisdiction in Daimler and Goodyear.158
Before those cases, a foreign corporation with systematic and
continuous operations in a U.S. state would be seen by most U.S.
courts as being subject to general jurisdiction in that
location—even for cases arising in distant parts with no connection
to the U.S. operations.159 As the facts of Daimler suggest, where
California was sought as a forum to address charges of human
rights violations in Argentina with no U.S. nexus, this broad of an
approach had the possible effect of opening U.S. courts to all kinds
of cases against multinational corporations with a significant U.S.
presence—which is to say, against almost all major multinational
corporations.160
Daimler put that approach to bed, and in its approach created
an implicit distinction between domestic and alien corporations.161
adversely affected); Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role
of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV .
I NT ’L L.J. 373 (1995) (arguing for applying international law of jurisdiction when
alien defendants are involved). For a discussion of issues involving plaintiffs, see
Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions
and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV . 41, 61–76 (2003) (looking at the
issue of binding international plaintiff class members in transnational class
actions). But see Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY
L.J. 509, 549–55 (2019) (arguing that no special standard should exist for alien
defendants).
157. See Parrish, supra note 156, at 59 (“The jurisdictional standards derived
from the due process clause have blithely been assumed to apply to foreign
defendants. No coherent explanation, however, exists for why nonresident, alien
defendants are entitled to constitutional protections in the jurisdictional
context.”).
158. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text (explaining how these
cases narrowed the definition of general jurisdiction to apply only in situations
where a defendant can be said to be “at home” in the jurisdiction).
159. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (recalling a time when general
jurisdiction could be based simply on “continuous and systematic general business
contacts”).
160. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (explaining how the effects
of globalization and the concentration of economic wealth in major corporations
create a world where many multinational companies engage in systematic and
continuous contacts in many locations in the United States).
161. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (emphasizing that
a U.S. court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only when it can
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Domestic corporations are likely to have both a principal place of
business and a state of incorporation within the U.S., making them
subject to suit somewhere in the U.S. under general jurisdiction.162
Alien corporations, by definition, will have neither, and so will not
be subject to general jurisdiction within the U.S.163
Another distinction, which is less automatic, dates back to
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.164 In Asahi, the Court
faced a situation where all that remained of a tort case was an
impleader claim filed by a foreign defendant against another
foreign defendant.165 The Justices split 4–4 on whether minimum
contacts existed where the stream of commerce had brought the
offending product into the U.S.166 An eight-justice majority did
conclude, however, that it would not be “reasonable” to exert
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant where the remaining center
of gravity of the case lay elsewhere.167
The reasonableness test employed by the Court in Asahi
looked at multiple factors, including “the burden on the defendant,
the interests of the forum State, . . . the plaintiff’s interest in
be rendered essentially “at home” in the forum State).
162. See id. at 137 (defining a corporation’s domicile, where it is subject to
general jurisdiction, to include either its place of incorporation or principal place
of business).
163. This leaves aside the issue of whether the general jurisdiction of a U.S.
subsidiary can be imputed to the overseas parent, an issue briefed but not reached
in Daimler. See Qingxiu Bu, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction vis-à-vis Sovereignty in
Tackling Transnational Counterfeits: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 100 J.
PAT . & TRADEMARK OFF . SOC ’Y 69, 74 (2018) (discussing post-Daimler lower court
cases involving separate legal entities within a corporate structure).
164. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
165. See id. at 106 (“[Claims against] the other defendants were eventually
settled and dismissed, leaving only [the Taiwanese tube manufacturer]’s
indemnity action against [the Japanese tire valve manufacturer].”).
166. Compare id. at 112 (“[Asahi’s] placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State.”), with id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing Asahi
“engaged in a higher quantum of conduct” than simply a placement of a product
into a stream of commerce), and id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that
jurisdiction premised solely on the placement of a product into the stream of
commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause).
167. See id. at 115 (“Considering the international context, the heavy burden
on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum
State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this
instance would be unreasonable and unfair.”).
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obtaining relief[,] . . . ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies[,] and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.”’168 Applying this test to the facts of
Asahi, the Court found alienage highly relevant to the
reasonableness test, and placed major reliance on “[t]he unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal
system.”169
The Court’s reliance on alienage in Asahi was one factor in
what must be a multi-factor balancing system, and stops far short
of establishing an absolute rule or even a presumption that
personal jurisdiction against an alien defendant will not be
reasonable. That said, some scholars have viewed reasonableness
as being especially directed at alien defendants,170 and a study of
specific personal jurisdiction cases examining use of the
reasonableness test found that courts were far more likely to
dismiss on reasonableness (rather than minimum contacts)
grounds when the defendant was an alien.171
A more subtle issue with foreign defendants has to do with the
rules related to jurisdictional challenges. Unlike as is true in most
motions to dismiss, the court should not accept the plaintiff’s
allegations with regard to personal jurisdiction as true; rather, the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual basis for personal
jurisdiction.172 With regard to a foreign defendant selling
168. Id. at 113 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980)).
169. Id. at 114.
170. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 83, at 1207 (discussing the differences
in the treatment of aliens and domestic defendants in personal jurisdiction
matters).
171. See Linda J. Silberman & Nathan D. Yaffe, The Transnational Case in
Conflict of Laws: Two Suggestions for the New Restatement Third of Conflict of
Laws—Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants and Party Autonomy in
International Contracts, 27 DUKE J. COMP . & I NT ’L L. 405, 408 (2017) (“[C]ourts
in practice only dismiss on reasonableness grounds where the defendant is
foreign, whereas they effectively never dismiss domestic defendants on grounds
of reasonableness.”); see generally Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying “Fair Play and
Substantial Justice”: How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for
Personal Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS C ONST . L.Q. 441 (1991) (discussing generally
the application by lower courts of the reasonableness factors).
172. See Charles W. Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 257 (2014)
(“For purposes of jurisdiction, in particular, it is error to accept the plaintiff’s
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nationally in the U.S., even though it may be clear that the U.S.
market was targeted, whether a specific state was targeted may
not be clear from publicly available information.173 While, in
theory, jurisdictional discovery could solve this problem, other
nations often have no equivalent of U.S. private discovery, and
actually getting discovery information from an overseas defendant
can be a challenge.174 As a practical matter, establishing the
factual predicates for personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants, especially if the proof required must establish
granular targeting of a kind that cannot be deduced from the
regular presence of the product in the stream of commerce, can
make it more difficult to bring foreign defendants into court.175
Despite these structural differences, the Court’s analysis of
cases, such as Nicastro, that involved foreign defendants have
stayed far away from taking into express account the non-U.S.
nature of these defendants.176 This is curious for a number of
reasons, especially as state-versus-state sovereignty concerns

allegations as true.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits
Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1301, 1330 (2012) (“If
the court automatically accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true, it will be
assuming the existence of facts giving rise to jurisdiction—and it will thereby
assume the existence of jurisdiction even in cases where it lacks the power to
act.”).
173. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., plurality) (finding no conclusive proof that defendant had engaged
in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey when 1) defendant agreed to sell
machines in the United States, 2) attended trade shows in several other states,
and 3) four machines ended up in New Jersey).
174. See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell & Ellen Claar Campbell, Clash of
Systems: Discovery in U.S. Litigation Involving Chinese Defendants, 4 PEKING U.
TRANSNAT ’L L. R EV. 129, 161 (2016) (discussing a case where jurisdictional
discovery was only obtained after the trial judge issued an order banning the
Chinese defendant from doing any business in the United States) (citing Germano
v. Taishan Gypsum Co., No. 2047, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183686, at *5 (E.D. La.
July 17, 2014)); id. at 144 (describing a case where jurisdictional discovery against
a third party had to be compelled with punitive fines) (citing Gucci Am., Inc. v.
Huoqing, No C-09-05969, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 783, at *58–59 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3,
2011)).
175. See Campbell & Campbell, supra note 174, at 150–54 (emphasizing the
differences in discovery procedures internationally and the difficulty of merging
them with the U.S. approach).
176. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 881 (applying the “purposeful availment” test
to foreign and domestic defendants alike without differentiation).
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move back into the analysis.177 There is some question as to
whether nonresident alien defendants can even invoke the
constitutional liberty interest viewed in older cases as being at the
core of the doctrine.178
It matters because U.S. citizens might be sent to a foreign
forum. As the Court noted in Asahi, litigating in a foreign land
under strange laws can be a burden.179 In some cases, this may be
the fate to which U.S. citizens are consigned as U.S. courts are
closed, as they might be if the test requires a relationship with a
specific state. Even if a domestic U.S. forum exists for the alien
defendant, it will not be the home forum for the defendant.180 If the
defendant is domestic, a U.S. state might have an arguable
interest in the litigation involving its citizen; when the defendant
is foreign, with the relationship created solely by the defendant’s
state of mind, the alternative U.S. forum may have no real interest
in the litigation.181 It may be a state like Ohio would have been in
Nicastro, with no connection with the dispute except that at one
time the defendant through one sided actions “purposefully
availed” itself of a relationship with the forum by using Ohio as the
state of entry for its products.182 In such a situation, while personal
177. See infra Part III.A.
178. See Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA.
J. I NT ’L L. 325, 329 (2018) (“The Court has assumed, but never held, that foreign
parties enjoy Due Process jurisdictional protections—an assumption in tension
with the general rule that foreign parties acquire constitutional rights in
proportion to their connections to the United States.”); see also Drobak, supra note
134, at 1739–40 (arguing that non-resident aliens have no due process
protections); Parrish, supra note 156, at 28–32 (suggesting Due Process
protections do not apply to alien defendants).
179. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (“The
unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system
should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the
long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”).
180. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (emphasizing that
a U.S. court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only when it can
be rendered essentially “at home” in the forum State).
181. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–16 (noting the minimal interest the
forum of California has in asserting jurisdiction over the foreign defendant in a
context where the only relationship with the forum hinges on the defendant
purposefully engaging in forum activities).
182. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 896 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“From at least
1995 until 2001, [defendant] retained an Ohio-based company, [McIntyre
America], as its exclusive distributor for the entire United States.”) (internal
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jurisdiction might exist, the suit might be subject to dismissal
under state forum non conveniens doctrine, leaving the U.S.
plaintiff, again, with no U.S. forum.183
The Court’s failure to treat alien defendants differently—or
even to consider whether it should treat alien defendants
differently—contrasts with a body of scholarship that argues for
different treatment.184 Recognizing that international marketers
may not target local markets, and that connections with any one
state may be attenuated in a national marketing scheme, several
scholars have called for an approach that aggregates national
contacts.185
Curiously, in Nicastro, Justice Kennedy’s plurality posited
that Congress might be able to base personal jurisdiction on
national contacts with regard to federal court, but that in state
courts the only relevant contacts were those connected to the state,
even for foreign defendants.
In this case, petitioner directed marketing and sales efforts at
the United States. It may be that, assuming it were otherwise
empowered to legislate on the subject, the Congress could
authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate
courts . . . . Here the question concerns the authority of a New
Jersey state court to exercise jurisdiction, so it is petitioner’s
purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with the United
States, that alone are relevant.186

If adopted by the entire court, Justice Kennedy’s requirement
of a state-by-state focus creates a disconnect between regulatory
realities and personal jurisdiction. While, as Justice Kennedy
noted, some foreign companies might indeed engage in
state-by-state targeting,187 it seems just as likely that with regard
quotations omitted).
183. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 83, at 1231–32 (stating that suit in
unrelated forum would “almost certainly” be dismissed on grounds of forum non
conveniens).
184. See, e.g., Degnan & Kane, supra note 156, at 799–800 (arguing for a
national contacts approach to alien defendants in state and federal courts).
185. See id. at 820 (proposing that the court, in assessing a foreign defendant’s
contacts, should consider their aggregate strength).
186. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885–86 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., plurality).
187. See id. at 884–85 (“Furthermore, foreign corporations will often target or
concentrate on particular States, subjecting them to specific jurisdiction in those
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to geography, the U.S. market as a whole would be the target.188
Brands may be developed globally, and probably will be for major
companies.189 For products, advertising venues, national trade
shows, and online retailers all present products to national rather
than local audiences, and in at least some cases those venturing
into the U.S. market will hope to capture as wide an audience as
possible.190 Others, looking for niches, might define those niches by
categories other than state boundaries.191 Under Justice Kennedy’s
formulation, only those who develop sufficient contacts with one or
forums.”).
188. See Harrison, supra note 153, at 2 (“[I]n today’s global economy a
manufacturer’s specific intentional contact with an individual state is a rarity.”);
Hay, supra note 60, at 434 (“[T]he foreign-country manufacturer deals with the
United States as a single market. Its concern is presumably less with whether the
defendant is subject to suit in state X or state Y, but rather whether it is subject
to suit in the United States at all.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1385–86 (2006)
[M]ost products are mass produced and mass distributed, without any
clear sense of where in the national market they might end up . . . . The
upshot is that most manufacturers design and market uniform
products rather than different products for each state and,
correspondingly, design their products to the specifications of the
largest states or to the jurisdiction with the most stringent liability
standards . . . .
189. Justice Kennedy’s analysis reveals a critical lack of awareness of how
consumers are targeted by brands, and not just by efforts to sell particular
products. Important brands today are global, with marketing campaigns designed
to establish the brand across not just state but national borders. See BARBARA E.
KAHN, GLOBAL B RAND P OWER : LEVERAGING BRANDING FOR LONG TERM G ROWTH
1 (“Brands today must be global . . . . [A] strong global brand must express the
same core meanings regardless of the market it is in.”). While brand holders
selling specific products will necessarily adapt branding and sales techniques to
fit local cultures and communities, there is no particular reason to think that
those adaptations will follow state lines—that, for example, a foreign
manufacturer will present its brand and products differently in New Jersey than
in Delaware. See Issacharoff, supra note 188, at 1385–86 (explaining how mass
production requires goods to be produced for potential distribution and sale
anywhere demand might arise, without a particular location in mind).
190. See Harrison, supra note 153, at 2 (explaining how manufacturers use
national and international marketing campaigns or the assistance of the Internet
to make entire nations the target audience for its products).
191. For example, while it markets somewhat differently in the U.S. than in
other countries, the targeting for the Estee Lauder Origins brand in the U.S.
turns on demographics rather than geography. See KAHN, supra note 189, at
34 – 35 (“[T]oday’s Origins brand is more tightly focused on a key target segment
in the United States, the 35- to 45-year-old woman who is concerned with health
and with the products she chooses to put on her face.”).
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more particular states would be subject to jurisdiction in U.S. state
courts, notwithstanding the success of their marketing efforts.192
D. Current U.S. Personal Jurisdiction in Comparative Context
At one time, U.S. jurisdiction could with some fairness be
accused of being exorbitant.193 Before Daimler, general jurisdiction
as it was commonly understood allowed assertion of claims,
regardless of connection with the forum, in any location where the
defendant maintained sufficient continuous and systematic
contacts.194 As a practical matter, operation of a significant
operation in a given location made it a forum suitable for any claim
from anywhere in the world, so far as personal jurisdiction was
concerned.195 (There were, of course, other obstacles to having the
suit proceed in that location, such as forum non conveniens).196
That changed after Daimler.197 Except in rare and so far
unseen circumstances, general jurisdiction can be found only
where a company is headquartered or has its principal place of
business.198 For foreign corporations, that will be nowhere in the
United States.199

192. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 885–86 (emphasizing that petitioner’s
purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with the United States, are the only
relevant contacts in establishing personal jurisdiction).
193. See supra Part II.C.
194. See Cornett, supra note 80, at 104 (“Daimler departs from settled law
under which corporations have been subject to jurisdiction for all claims in states
where they maintained a sufficient permanent presence or engaged in a
comparable substantial level of business.”).
195. See Dodson, supra note 81, at 24 (explaining the common understanding
that companies doing substantial business in all fifty states would have been
subject to general jurisdiction in every state).
196. See Heiser, supra note 85, at 1050–56 (discussing application of the
forum non conveniens doctrine in limiting the reach of general jurisdiction).
197. See generally Cornett, supra note 80.
198. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (defining a
corporation’s domicile, where it is subject to general jurisdiction, to include either
its place of incorporation or principal place of business).
199. See Cornett, supra note 80, at 152 (“Where the manufacturer is a foreign
national corporation with its principal place of business outside the United
States, the corporation may evade general jurisdiction in any U.S. court.”).
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After Nicastro and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Court of
Cal.,200 while some doubt remains, it seems that specific
jurisdiction may also require the clearing of a high hurdle.201 Each
claim by each plaintiff against each defendant must be assessed
for forum specific contacts related to that claim.202 That each claim
must be assessed is clear from the nature of specific jurisdiction,
which bases personal jurisdiction on only those contacts that are
related to the claim.203 That each defendant must be assessed
separately was made clear in cases such as Rush v. Savchuk,204
where personal jurisdiction against some defendants did not bleed
over to other defendants.205 That each plaintiff must be assessed
separately, even when there is an ongoing case that the defendant
must defend, is clear from Bristol-Myers.206
In a complex case, that personal jurisdiction exists for a claim
by one plaintiff against one defendant does not guarantee that
personal jurisdiction exists for other claims and other parties that
are part of the same case.207 To help illuminate the situation,
200. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
201. See supra Part II.C(1)(b).
202. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82 (emphasizing that each
individual plaintiff must have minimum contacts with the forum and finding that
the nonresident plaintiffs’ connections with the applicable forum did not warrant
jurisdiction on this claim).
203. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 899 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court agrees that specific
jurisdiction turns on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy).
204. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
205. See id. at 331–32 (characterizing an attempt to aggregate the defendants’
forum contacts “plainly unconstitutional”). This was also the case in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen,
it seems likely under the law of the time that the existence of general jurisdiction
against the German parent and the U.S. importer was assumed due to the high
level of activity each had in Oklahoma. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
297 (stating that if the sale of a product is not an isolated occurrence, but arises
from the efforts of the manufacturer to serve the market, directly or indirectly,
for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject the manufacturer
to suit in one of those states). After Daimler, it is clear that general jurisdiction
would not exist against those defendants. See Cornett, supra note 80, at 105–06
(describing Daimler as a “game changer” in restricting the existing law of
personal jurisdiction).
206. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82 (stating that each individual
plaintiff must have minimum contacts with the forum).
207. See, e.g., id. at 1781 (explaining that the nonresident defendants’
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consider a case similar to the well-known civil procedure standard
of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.208
Imagine that in Hubei province, China, a company makes a valve
designed to be used in water heaters. Since, in China, an export
license must be acquired for goods to be sold abroad, the seller is
aware that the product will head overseas, and given the flow of
world trade is most likely generally aware that some will end up
in the United States. In addition, as a practical matter, the
manufacturer may have taken steps to qualify under international
quality assurance protocols such as ISO 9001, again indicating an
awareness of export markets. In our hypothetical, the valve is sold
to a water heater manufacturer in Guangdong Province, which
includes it in products that have been designed for, among other
markets, sale in the United States. Using an export company that
provides the necessary export license, these water heaters are then
sold in massive quantities to a distributor in Hong Kong, which in
turn sells them in massive quantities to markets in the United
States.
On these facts, general jurisdiction clearly does not exist.209
Quite possibly, neither does specific jurisdiction, especially if the
state-by-state targeting imagined by the plurality in Nicastro is
required.210 Even if the water heater manufacturer explicitly dealt
with the export agent and the Hong Kong distributor in order to
get access to the U.S. market, and even if the product was
specifically designed for the U.S. market (say, for example, by
being designed to use 110 volt power instead of the internationally
more common 220 volt), evidence of state-specific targeting is
likely to be lacking at the manufacturer level. Even for the Hong
Kong distributor—which is not likely to have been responsible for
either defective design or defective manufacturing, and may be
relationship with the defendants who were California residents was insufficient
basis for the nonresidents to establish personal jurisdiction for a claim before the
California courts).
208. 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
209. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (defining a corporation’s domicile, where it
is subject to general jurisdiction, to include either its place of incorporation or
principal place of business). Here, the hypothetical valve company is not
incorporated, nor does it have a place of business, in the United States.
210. See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Kennedy’s proposal of a state-by-state, as opposed to national, focus for contacts
determining personal jurisdiction in state courts).
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equally unaware of any problems, and so may not be liable in any
event211—evidence of state-by-state targeting may not exist if the
distributor dealt with a national retailer or national distributor to
the plumbing trade.
Consider the situation in the reverse, assuming a valve
manufactured in Ohio, incorporated in a water heater in Illinois,
then shipped to China. In China, as in many civil law countries,
jurisdiction lies not just where the defendant is domiciled but
where the tort took place.
According to the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court
on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s
Republic of China, Art. 24, “places where the tort occurs” include
the places where the tort is committed and the places where the
result of a tort occurs.212 In the hypothetical case, the hazardous
products have caused bodily damages and property damages in
China. Therefore, the results of the tortious acts happen within
Chinese territorial boundaries, permitting a Chinese court to
exercise jurisdiction.213 Put differently, if the plaintiff is injured by
211. In many cases, so-called “seller’s exception statutes” will release an
innocent seller or distributor who was not aware of the alleged defect. See, e.g.,
Nicholas Owen McCann, The “Seller’s Exception” Defense to Product Liability
Actions, 103 I LL . B.J. 40 (2015) (discussing application of Illinois statute). The
application of these statutes is complex, however, because of varying exceptions
allowing the retailer to be sued, including in some cases where the manufacturer
is immune to service of process. See, e.g., Ashley L. Thompson, Note, The
Unintended Consequence of Tort Reform in Michigan: An Argument for
Reinstating Retailer Product Liability, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 961 (2009)
(arguing that liability over retailers should be reinstated because foreign
manufacturers could evade jurisdiction). For a more general discussion of reseller
liability, see Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A
Proposal for Change, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1031, 1081–1120 (2003) (discussing
shortcomings in existing seller liability statutes and proposing a statutory
solution). In addition, some major online marketplaces disclaim liability, claiming
that when they only serve as a listing service they have no exposure. In one such
case, Amazon paid only a $5000 nuisance settlement when a motorcycle helmet
fraudulently listed as compliant with regulations failed, causing death. See
Alexandra Berzon et al., Amazon Has Ceded Control of Its Site. The Result:
Thousands of Banned, Unsafe or Mislabeled Products, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 23,
2019 8:56 AM ET), https://perma.cc/M8M7-JM9H (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
212. The Supreme People’s Court, Interpretations of the Supreme People’s
Court on Applicability of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of
China, Art. 24 (Jan. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/P9RH-QDXD (PDF).
213. See id. at Art. 26 (granting jurisdiction to the court in the location where
the tort was committed in any lawsuit filed in connection with property or
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the failure of a product in China, a Chinese court would most likely
assert jurisdiction.
China’s approach is not exceptional, but tracks the approach
of many, if not most, civil law countries.214 Rather than engaging
in an analysis of what expectations or intentions the defendant had
at the time the product was designed or marketed, the analysis
looks to where the tortious act occurred—which is to say, where
the product failed and where injury occurred.215 Arguments that
the forum is not an appropriate forum for the litigation must follow
a different path than arguing that the country lacks power to hear
a case where a citizen was injured within its borders by a
malfunctioning product.216
This approach avoids some of the complications of the U.S.
approach. Jurisdiction is not a defendant-by-defendant or
claim-by-claim analysis, but an inquiry into whether the court has
a reasonable relationship with the case.217 The failure of a product
in the forum country combined with an injured plaintiff in the
forum provides a sufficient relationship.218 There is no suggestion
that anyone look at whether the valve manufacturer sought to
have a relationship with the Guangdong or Hubei provinces, or
even if any particular awareness of China’s domestic subparts was
ever a consideration.
The net is that U.S. courts in the post-Daimler, post-Nicastro,
post-Bristol-Myers era seem in garden variety products liability
cases, among others, to assert a much shorter jurisdictional reach

personal damage arising from inferior quality of manufactured products or
services). The European Union has a similar rule. Council Regulation 44/2001 of
22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC).
214. See Ryngaert, supra note 129 (discussing the approach of other civil law
countries).
215. Id.
216. Id.; see also Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the
International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention Be
Stalled, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 328–31 (2002).
217. Ryngaert, supra note 129.
218. Id.
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than other countries.219 Claims that would proceed without undue
worry in other countries fail in the United States.220
This failure matters, in particular, because the U.S. conducts
so much of its regulatory activity and consumer protection through
the court system.221 Closing the U.S. courts to such claims
therefore, to an extent much greater than in other countries, also
cancels U.S. regulatory protections. The inability of U.S. courts to
effectively regulate and protect its citizens and markets implicates
its national sovereignty.222 The degree to which specific jurisdiction
will be narrowed depends in large part on how the justices
approach the ideas of federalism and state sovereignty expressed
in the Nicastro plurality and repeated in the Bristol-Myers
holding.223 Those ideas deserve unpacking.
III. The Supreme Court’s Flawed Approach to Horizontal
Rivalrous State Federalism
In Nicastro and Bristol-Myers, the Justices’ foreclosing
assertions of specific personal jurisdiction relied on a shorthand
invocation of “our federalism” as the basis.224 For those used to the
219. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Moody’s Corp., 821 F.3d 102,
106–07 (1st Cir. 2016) (failing to find personal jurisdiction for defendant under
Daimler standard); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221,
223 (2d Cir. 2014) (interpreting Daimler to reaffirm the extension of general
jurisdiction beyond an entity’s state of incorporation and principal place of
business to only exist in “exceptional” cases and declining to find the defendant
“at home” in New York).
220. The injury in Nicastro, for example, would in most other countries be
viewed as a tort occurring within the jurisdiction, allowing an assertion of court
power. See, e.g., Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court, supra note 212, at
Art. 26. Similarly, much of the angst over stream-of-commerce products liability
would be unnecessary.
221. See generally SEAN FARHANG, T HE LITIGATION STATE : PUBLIC
REGULATION AND PRIVATE L AWSUITS IN THE U NITED STATES 19–59 (2010).
222. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in
Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. RES . L. REV . 769, 800 (2016) (explaining how
“if a state lacked the power to regulate in-state conduct in a way that caused
extraterritorial effects, state sovereignty would be eviscerated in our modern
interconnected nation”).
223. See infra Part III.
224. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1776 (2017) (asserting that despite all other interests being in favor of granting
jurisdiction, “interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its
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debates over state and federal power in the standard back and
forth over vertical federalism, the kind of federalism asserted in
Nicastro and Bristol-Myers is a curious kind of federalism.225 It is
all the more curious because while invoking “our federalism” in
both Nicastro and Bristol-Myers, the Justices have shown no
interest in explaining how they understand and wish to apply “our
federalism.”226
In the academic world, at least, federalism comes in more
flavors than can be found at a well-stocked gelato stand. There is
state sovereignty federalism,227 nationalist federalism,228 political
process federalism,229 competitive federalism,230 cooperative

power” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294
(1980))).
225. See id. at 1780–81 (discussing federalism in the context of jurisdiction
analysis); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884–885 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., plurality) (same).
226. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (lacking any explanation of
“federalism interests” other than as a restriction imposed by the sovereignty of
other states on the sovereignty of each individual state); Nicastro, 564 U.S. at
884–85 (stating simply that “if another state were to assert jurisdiction in an
inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each
State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States”).
227. See MARTIN DIAMOND, T HE FOUNDING OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
124–25 (1981) (“Modern federalism is a system of divided sovereignty; the whole
unseparated governing authority respecting certain matters given to the national
government, and the whole unseparated governing authority respecting others
given to the states. . . . [T]he American system is the very model of a modern
federal system[.]”). Diamond proceeds to a more nuanced discussion of how
federalism operates in the modern era. Id.
228. For a discussion of this and a helpful review of federalism literature, see
generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF . L. REV. 1695 (2017).
See also Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?,
59 ST . LOUIS U. L.J. 997, 997 (2015) (characterizing the debate between
nationalists and state sovereignty federalist like a boxing match between “aging
boxing club members” who know each other’s moves).
229. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM . L. REV. 543 (1954) (arguing that the national political process of the
United States today, especially the role of states in selecting the federal
government, continues to be well-adapted to promoting federalism).
230. See generally THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM : COMPETITION
AMONG G OVERNMENTS (1990) (proposing, as a solution to governmental abuse of
power, the encouragement of rivalry among state and local governments to offer
taxpayers the best array of public services at the lowest costs).
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federalism,231 dual federalism,232 new nationalism federalism,233
horizontal federalism,234 diagonal federalism,235 polyphonic
federalism,236 foreign affairs federalism,237 and many more. These
tags represent serious work at understanding how our compound
government does and should work, both based on the text of the
Constitution and digging deep into how it functions on the ground

231. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) (“In contrast to a dual
federalism, cooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory authority
between the federal government and the states that allows states to regulate
within a framework delineated by federal law.”) For a critique of cooperative
federalism, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t,
96 MICH. L. REV . 813, 938–44 (1998) (proposing a functional theory of cooperative
federalism as an alternative to the theory of nationalistic dual federalism).
232. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV .
1, 1–4 (1950) (discussing the United States’ acceptance of a shift toward
consolidation of national power in the 1950s, moving away from a system in which
power is divided between the federal and state governments in clearly defined
terms).
233. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An
Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1892–94 (2014) (describing how federalism may
serve national ends and promote a well-functioning national democracy).
234. See, e.g., JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, HORIZONTAL F EDERALISM : I NTERSTATE
RELATIONS (2011); Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493
(2008).
235. See Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 267–88 (2011)
(describing a multidimensional approach to federalism that incorporates actors
at all vertical levels of government and involves coordination among these actions
through horizontal relationships).
236. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM : TOWARD THE
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 92–120 (2009) (proposing a model of
federalism that emphasizes the interaction of state and federal law and more
accurately reflects the intersecting realities of local and national power); Robert
A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 I OWA L. REV. 243
(2005) (arguing for a “polyphonic” view of federalism); Robert A. Schapiro,
Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post-Westphalian
World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115 (2007) [hereinafter Schapiro, Intersystemic
Governance] (outlining the concept of polyphonic federalism and applying it to
issues of governmental legitimacy).
237. See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS FEDERALISM : T HE MYTH OF NATIONAL E XCLUSIVITY (2016) (examining
the role cities and states play directly in foreign affairs); see also Robert B. Ahdieh,
Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from
Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185 (2008).
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as our culture and economy have changed. Kennedy’s wave of the
hand at “our federalism” engaged not at all with this dialogue.238
To a significant, but not exclusive, degree, the federalism
debate addresses the split of power between the federal
government and the states.239 State sovereignty federalists argue
for more autonomy for states; nationalists argue for the primacy of
the federal government.240 Cooperative federalists note that, in the
modern era, state and federal regulatory programs are effectively
intertwined, albeit with the federal branch holding a dominant
position.241
In the common parlance of federalism, the discussion is largely
one about state power versus federal power.242 From the vantage
238. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011)
(mentioning briefly that “ours is a ‘legal system unprecedented in form and
design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct
relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the
people who sustain it and are governed by it’” (quoting U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995))).
239. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (“[W]hile
the Tenth Amendment makes explicit that ‘the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people’; the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and
state power has given rise to many [difficult Supreme Court] cases.”).
240. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM : A DIALOGUE 11 (1995) (describing
those who advocate strong central authority as nationalists and those who
advocate substantial diffusion of authority between the federal government and
the states as federalists).
241. See Weiser, supra note 231, at 665 (“In contrast to a dual federalism,
cooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory authority between the
federal government and the states that allows states to regulate within a
framework delineated by federal law.”). The standard argument is that
cooperative federalism emerged from the regulatory programs of the New Deal.
See id. at 669 (“Although these [New Deal] programs involved the sharing of
funding, as opposed to regulatory authority, they put the concept of cooperative
federalism on the map.”). However, there is also an argument that Gilded Age
reforms laid the foundation. See KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE
AMERICAN STATE : CONGRESS AND THE NEW FEDERALISM , 1877–1929, at 6 (2007)
(tracing the emergence and development of cooperative federalism back to Gilded
Age congressional policies).
242. See Heather K. Gerken, The Taft Lecture: Living Under Someone Else’s
Law, 84 CIN. L. REV. 377, 380 (2016) (“If you were to read the U.S Reports, you’d
probably miss the fact that ‘Our Federalism’ encompasses relations among the
states as well as relations between the states and federal government. Vertical
federalism is federalism as far as most people are concerned.”); Heather K.
Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113
MICH. L. REV. 57, 59 (2014) (“[C]ourts and scholars have neglected federalism’s

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

143

point of traditional federalists, states should have more power, not
less, and not be shunted aside by federal power.243 That, most
definitely, is not the effect of “our federalism” asserted in
Nicastro.244 In Nicastro, a state court sought to entertain a tort
action on behalf of one of its own citizens who had suffered a
terrible injury.245 The federal government, acting through its
judicial branch, stepped in to foreclose this exercise of state
power.246 Rather than being enhanced, state power was
eviscerated.247
A. The Revival of State Sovereignty as a Concern
Curiously, this limiting of state regulation has arisen because
the Court has in recent years developed a tender regard for
protecting state sovereignty. The Court starts from a premise that
sees states as rivals, and the assertion of one state’s power as
diminishing the power of a sister state.248
horizontal dimensions.”).
243. See Holtzblatt, supra note 242, at 104 (“Sovereignty fans who write about
vertical federalism look to the judiciary to preserve states’ ability to serve as rivals
and competitors to the national government.”).
244. One explanation, of course, is that any abstract consideration of
federalism is trumped by the Justice’s view of the desirability of civil litigation.
See Brooke D. Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL . L. REV. 307 (2014)
(arguing that the Justices’ views in cases involving access to state courts reflect
their views on civil litigation). But see Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W.
Rhodes, The Business of Personal Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES . L. REV. 775,
776 – 77 (2017)
We find little evidence that the Court was motivated by a desire to
favor business interests . . . . [I]t appears the Court was driven more
by a commitment to formalist evaluation of individual cases and a
generalized resistance to allowing United States courts to serve as a
magnet forum for transnational litigation.
245. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 879 (“[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded that New Jersey courts could exercise jurisdiction over [defendant]
without contravention of the Due Process Clause.”).
246. See id. at 887 (failing to find the New Jersey courts to have jurisdiction
over defendant).
247. See id. (“New Jersey is without power to adjudge the rights and liabilities
of [defendant], and its exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process.”).
248. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every
tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it
is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be
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State sovereignty was built into the U.S. approach to personal
jurisdiction from the beginning.249 In the landmark case of
Pennoyer v. Neff,250 state jurisdiction was tied to the state’s
territorial limits.251 Each state had “exclusive” jurisdiction over
persons and property within its borders.252 The Court’s power could
be viewed as being very much like a magic wand—capable of
pulling into court anything within the state boundaries, but utterly
without effect on the other side of the territorial line.253
As was apparent even within Pennoyer, the absolute and
exclusive sovereignty approach did not quite work.254 As the
Pennoyer Court went to pains to make clear in dicta, citizens of a
state remained under the power of the state’s courts no matter
where they resided, even if that residence gave other states
parallel and competing power over them; some proceedings such
as divorce also required extraterritorial reach if a recalcitrant
spouse refused to travel back to the state, again even though other
states might also be able to exercise jurisdiction over the matter.255
The territorialism issue became more problematic as the shift
to a national, industrialized economy brought out-of-state
corporations into the state to do business.256 Since corporations
deemed . . . an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.”
(citing D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 175 (1851))).
249. See id. at 722 (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory . . . . [N]o State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory.”).
250. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
251. See id. at 722 (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”).
252. Id. Even in Pennoyer, territorial exclusivity was not quite pure—an
exception allowed for extraterritorial jurisdiction over citizens and over
proceedings such as dissolution of a marriage formed in the state. Id. at 734–35.
253. See id. at 722–23 (explaining the elementary principle laid down by
jurists that “no tribunal established by [a State] can extend its process beyond
that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions”).
254. See id. at 732 (“[A]s contracts made in one State may be enforceable only
in another State, and property may be held by non-residents, the exercise of the
jurisdiction which every State is admitted to possess over persons and property
within its own territory will often affect persons and property without it.”).
255. See id. at 734–35 (enumerating the exceptions allowing for
extraterritorial jurisdiction).
256. See, e.g., Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530, 532–33
(1907) (addressing the question of jurisdiction in a situation involving an
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have no corporeal presence, the issue arose as to when a
corporation could be deemed present in a state.257 This led to an
increasingly awkward series of decisions in which activities in the
state were assessed in order to determine “presence.”258 A major
conceptual shift occurred with the landmark case of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.259 Discarding the fictions of presence, the
court looked to the core due process issue, and grounded its
analysis in whether the contacts with the state were such as to
make pulling a defendant into court consistent with the
fundamental fairness concerns embodied in due process.260 The
emphasis shifted away from a preoccupation with presence within
the borders of the state and toward a functional analysis based on
fairness to the defendant.261
For a while after International Shoe, it looked as if this
approach might lead to something like national service of
process.262 Jurisdiction was found even when the contacts with the
state seemed attenuated.263
The Court pushed back against this, however, in a series of
decisions that reasserted the importance of specific ties to the

interstate railroad).
257. See id. at 532 (“[The exercise of personal jurisdiction’s] validity depends
upon whether the corporation was doing business in that district in such a
manner and to such an extent as to warrant the inference that through its agents
it was present there.”).
258. See, e.g., id. at 533–34; Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579,
585–86 (1914).
259. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
260. See id. at 316–17 (“[T]he terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts
will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”).
261. See id. (“[The demands of due process] may be met by such contacts of
the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context
of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit which is brought there.”).
262. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (“Looking back over
this long history of litigation [since Pennoyer] a trend is clearly discernible toward
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and other nonresidents.”).
263. See, e.g., id. at 223–25 (finding jurisdiction even where defendant had
not solicited or done any insurance business in the State apart from the policy
involved).
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forum.264 In Hanson v. Denckla,265 a battle between competing
court systems for control over an estate plan was resolved by
finding that a trustee could not be pulled into court in a state where
the only link was that the trust donor had chosen after the
establishment of the trust to move there.266 “Thrust upon” contacts
were not enough.267 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,268 foreseeability that a car could wind up in Oklahoma
was not enough to subject a local dealer to personal jurisdiction
there.269
In World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice White’s majority opinion
had language that seemed to suggest that state sovereignty and
associated territoriality were central to the analysis. White wrote:
But the Framers also intended that the States retain many
essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the
sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of
each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of
all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment.270

This seemed a major shift from an approach centered on
fairness to the defendant that had dominated since International
Shoe.271
264. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (failing to find
sufficient ties to the forum and emphasizing that “it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws”).
265. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
266. See id. at 252 (“In contrast [with the facts of McGee], this action involves
the validity of an agreement that was entered without any connection with the
forum State.”).
267. See id. at 251 (“We fail to find such [minimum] contacts in the
circumstances of this case.”).
268. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
269. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (“It is foreseeable that the
purchasers of automobiles sold by [defendant] may take them to Oklahoma. But
the mere ‘unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State.’” (quoting Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253)).
270. Id. at 293.
271. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“To require
the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or
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In a subsequent decision, however, another opinion by Justice
White rejected the idea of state sovereignty as driving the analysis,
and centered it clearly on an individual liberty interest protected
by the Due Process clause.
The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects
an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty. Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction
requires that “the maintenance of the suit . . . not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”272

In a footnote, the Court went on to be explicit that liberty
interests alone underpinned personal jurisdiction doctrine:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as
ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved
by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes
no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the
federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on
the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to
waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions
cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the
individual can subject himself to powers from which he may
otherwise be protected.273

As a personal right, the Court went on to hold, personal
jurisdiction could be waived by the individual, which is not the case
when the limitation goes to the power of a branch of government.274
The Court thus drew a sharp distinction between subject matter
jurisdiction, which is based on the limitations inherent in the
Constitution on one branch of government (the federal courts), and
personal jurisdiction, which it held goes not to institutional

other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought
to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with
due process.”).
272. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 – 03 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
273. Id. at 703 n.10.
274. See id. at 703 (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be
waived.”).
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limitations and rivalries but only to the liberty interest of an
individual.275
Even without an explicit focus on sovereignty as an
underpinning of personal jurisdiction, the holdings in Hanson and
World-Wide Volkswagen underscored that borders were not
irrelevant and that national jurisdiction was not in the
cards276—the inquiry remained one that looked at the defendant’s
relationship with the forum state.277 The inquiry, however, seemed
focused on the defendant’s relationship with the forum state, and
not on concerns related to state rivalry.278
For a time that seemed to be the end of it—personal
jurisdiction was rooted in individual liberty, and not issues of rival
state sovereignty, while paying due regard to the defendant’s
connections with the forum state.279 As the Insurance Corp. of
Ireland280 decision noted, that was consistent with a number of
decisions about personal jurisdiction that had come down over the
years.281 Plaintiffs filing a claim would submit to personal
jurisdiction on counterclaims even if they had no connection with
the jurisdiction other than filing suit,282 contracting parties not
275. Id. at 704 (“[U]nlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which even an appellate
court may review sua sponte, under Rule 12(h), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
‘[a] defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . is waived’ if not timely raised
in the answer or a responsive pleading.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h))).
276. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (“Nevertheless, we have
never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution.”).
277. See id. at 292 (explaining that “[t]he relationship between the defendant
and the forum must be such that it is ‘reasonable . . . to require the corporation to
defend the particular suit which is brought there’” (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
317)).
278. See id. (omitting any discussion of state rivalry and instead emphasizing
“the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies”).
279. See supra notes 273–278 and accompanying text (arguing that personal
jurisdiction goes not to state power limitations and rivalries, but ultimately is
defined as a function of the liberty interest of an individual under the Due Process
Clause).
280. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
281. See id. at 702–03 (citing precedent and noting that “[the personal
jurisdiction requirement] represents a restriction on judicial power not as a
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty”).
282. See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938) (“The plaintiff
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imminently expecting litigation could submit to personal
jurisdiction in a forum where they might not be subject to personal
jurisdiction,283 and litigants would waive any right to assert
personal jurisdiction if they were not timely in asserting the
defense.284
If the stakeholder in a personal jurisdiction dispute was a
state, jealously preserving its power against rival states seeking to
usurp its sovereignty, none of these results are self-evident.285
Indeed, in the realm of subject matter jurisdiction, where the issue
clearly is delimiting federal versus state judicial power, none of
these results would hold—individuals are powerless to consent to
subject matter jurisdiction because the concern has to do with
institutional limitations.286 These results do make sense in the
context of a doctrine concerned with the defendant’s liberty
interests, with the stakeholder free to waive a doctrine that exists
for her benefit.287
The same can be said of the touchstone of minimum contacts
analysis when looking at specific jurisdiction, which is whether the
defendant purposefully availed itself of a connection with the

having, by his voluntary act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable
in treating him as being there for all purposes for which justice to the defendant
requires his presence.”).
283. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991)
(validating a forum selection clause that limited choice of forum to a Florida
district court that would not otherwise have personal jurisdiction over the
plaintiff).
284. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), 12(h)(1) (providing the manner in which
personal jurisdiction can be waived by a defendant).
285. But see Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 65
n.261, 95 n.365 (2010) (arguing that under a nuanced view of jurisdiction, taking
horizontal federalism concerns into account, a defendant could waive some bases
for objecting to an assertion to jurisdiction (e.g., a liberty interest) while being
unable to waive others (e.g., comity interests arising from state versus state
conflicts)). As the law exists, however, the defendant’s waiver controls.
286. See id. at 12 (distinguishing discretionary decisions made by state courts
from the “antecedent question of whether the Constitution limits the state’s
discretion to make any forum available in suits against a particular defendant”).
287. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), 12(h)(1) (permitting waiver by a defendant);
see also Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702 (stating that “the personal jurisdiction
requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest” (emphasis
added)).

150

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (2020)

forum state.288 From the perspective of whether a forum is
reasonable and fair, whether the defendant chose to have a
relationship makes obvious sense. From the perspective of
rivalrous state power, it is less self-evident that the test should be
what jurisdiction a defendant had in mind when taking actions
that later give rise to claims.
Then came Nicastro.289 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion
gave short shrift to the long line of cases focused on individual
liberty and asserted instead a theory of personal jurisdiction rooted
in state sovereignty.290 He acknowledged the history, but used a
bootstrap approach to reinvigorating sovereignty concerns:
Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts “judicial power not as
a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,”
for due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only
to lawful power. But whether a judicial judgment is lawful
depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it. 291

Kennedy’s view of state sovereignty adopted White’s earlier
view that states are primarily rivals, and that assertion of
jurisdiction by one state denigrates the sovereignty of others:
“[a]nd if another State were to assert jurisdiction in an
inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits
that each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful
intrusion by other States.”292
Despite reinvigorating sovereignty as a basis for limitations
on personal jurisdiction, Kennedy continued to base his analysis
on the familiar touchstone of purposeful availment. As he
explained:
Freeform fundamental fairness notions divorced from
traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered
without authority into law. As a general rule, the sovereign’s
exercise of power requires some act by which the defendant
“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting

288. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
289. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
290. See id. at 880–84 (identifying the competing concerns of sovereign
authority over fairness and foreseeability from past case law).
291. Id. at 884 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauites De Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)).
292. Id.
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activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”293

Under Kennedy’s approach, while not fully developed, it
appears that the proper state to exercise jurisdiction over McIntyre
was not New Jersey, where the machine was located and used,
where the accident occurred, and where the injured claimant lived,
but Ohio.294 Ohio was the state through which McIntyre imported
its machines, and therefore a state which the British manufacturer
had in mind when sending its machines to America.295 As a result,
there presumably existed purposeful availment with regard to
Ohio, a state with no other apparent connection to the controversy.
In Kennedy’s view, it appears that the defendant’s purposeful
availment of Ohio, and not New Jersey, made any assertion of
power by New Jersey an encroachment upon Ohio’s sovereignty.296
Kennedy’s approach was vigorously rejected in a dissent by
Justice Ginsburg. She argued:
New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer whose dangerous product caused a workplace
injury in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or diminish
the sovereignty, of any sister State. Indeed, among States of the
United States, the State in which the injury occurred would
seem most suitable for litigation of a products liability tort
claim.297

Justice Ginsburg also noted that the jurisdiction New Jersey
sought to exercise was not, under international norms, excessive
or extravagant.
The Court’s judgment also puts United States plaintiffs at a
disadvantage in comparison to similarly situated complainants
elsewhere in the world. Of particular note, within the European
Union, in which the United Kingdom is a participant, the
jurisdiction New Jersey would have exercised is not at all
293. Id. at 880 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
294. See id. at 886–87 (remarking that “these facts may reveal an intent to
serve the U.S market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed
itself of the New Jersey market”).
295. Id. at 898.
296. See id. at 884 (“[I]f another State were to assert jurisdiction in an
inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each
State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.”).
297. Id. at 899.
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exceptional. The European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments provides for the
exercise of specific jurisdiction “in matters relating to tort . . . in
the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.” The
European Court of Justice has interpreted this prescription to
authorize jurisdiction either where the harmful act occurred or
at the place of injury.298

Nicastro involved only a plurality decision, but similar state
sovereignty language was adopted by a solid eight justice majority
in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court. In this case, a
national class action sought to address claims that a
pharmaceutical product was defective.299 The case was filed in
California, where Bristol-Myers was not subject to general
jurisdiction post-Daimler as California was neither its state of
incorporation nor the site of its headquarters.300
The largest proportion of the plaintiff group was California
residents.301 For them, as sales and marketing had taken place in
California, specific jurisdiction existed.302 To this group, plaintiffs
wished to add plaintiffs from multiple other states.303 In those
cases, so far as the record showed, none of the actions giving rise
to their alleged injuries were connected to California.304 The
lawsuit therefore was one with a legitimate connection to
California, but with additional plaintiffs with no California
nexus.305 Put differently, unlike Daimler, this was not a case where
298. Id. at 909 (quoting 2001 O.J. (L 12) 4 (citing Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij
G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735)); see also id.
at 1780 (labeling state sovereignty a primary consideration in determining
whether personal jurisdiction is present).
299. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778
(2017).
300. See id. at 1781 (“Our settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction
control this case.”); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014)
(“The paradigm all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a corporation’s
place of incorporation and principal place of business.” (citing Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011))).
301. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
302. See id. at 1781 (acknowledging that California could assert specific
jurisdiction on behalf of the in-state residents).
303. Id.
304. See id. at 1781 (noting the absence of a relevant link between California
and the nonresident’s claims).
305. See id. (identifying a connection between defendant’s conduct and the
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general jurisdiction brought a case with no California connection
into a California court, but one with a connection to California and
with defendants with significant connections to California who
would have to defend an identical suit in California in any event,
but connections that did not specifically include the out-of-state
plaintiffs.306
The greatest danger of general jurisdiction—that ongoing
contacts with a state would make it a forum for unrelated litigation
from across the globe with no relationship to the forum—was not
raised by the facts in Bristol-Myers.307 The defendant had an
ongoing connection with the forum that all agreed justified some
kind of lawsuit in the forum, and the additional claims were
factually and legally related to the claims that arose in
California.308 Personal jurisdiction aside, the liberal joinder rules
common in the U.S. clearly allow and even encourage the
additional plaintiffs to join litigation so all claims could be tried in
one proceeding.309
On these facts, the lower court had applied a so-called “sliding
scale” of specific jurisdiction, finding that since Bristol-Myers had
engaged in extensive activities in California, a lesser level of nexus
was required.310 The court rejected this as a back door approach to
reviving the kind of broad “continuous contacts” general
jurisdiction rejected in Daimler.311 The Court then looked to the
California residents).
306. Compare id. (examining California’s exercise of jurisdiction over
California residents and nonresidents), with Daimler, 571 U.S. at 117
(considering a claim brought by twenty-two Argentinian nationals in California).
307. See generally Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1773.
308. See id. at 1781 (stating that the ability of third parties—the California
residents—to bring similar claims is irrelevant).
309. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966), superseded
by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2018) (identifying the broad scope of joinder of claims
and explaining that “[u]nder the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties . . . .”).
310. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 377 P.3d 874, 889 (Cal.
2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (applying California’s sliding-scale test, which
provides that extensive forum contacts will relax the requirements for
demonstrating a connection to the forum).
311. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781
(2017) (limiting systematic activity of a corporation to questions of specific
jurisdiction); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014) (cabining
the “continuous and systematic” inquiry to the exercise of specific jurisdiction
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connection with the forum for the non-California plaintiffs, and,
finding none, concluded that their lawsuit must be brought
elsewhere.312
Justice Alito’s opinion on behalf of an eight-justice majority
staked its approach on sovereignty and territoriality concerns.313
Quoting from Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen, it reiterated
that a state was diminished if another court asserted jurisdiction
that went beyond its powers.314 The terms “liberty interest” and
“fairness,” in contrast, appear nowhere in Justice Alito’s opinion.315
The result in Bristol-Myers was, while not preordained,
nonetheless not surprising. The plaintiffs dismissed from the
action had no connection to California, and had their cases been
brought as standalone cases there would have been no real
argument that California was an appropriate setting for the
litigation, whether as a matter of jurisdiction or of other doctrines
such as venue.316 It was a short step to expand previous rulings
requiring personal jurisdiction with regard to each defendant to
requiring personal jurisdiction for each plaintiff. Moreover, to have
held otherwise would have opened defendants up to nationwide
classes in any location where some local plaintiffs could be found,
which would have the effect (if the plaintiffs’ attorneys did their
work properly) of locating all claims nationwide in an unfriendly
forum.317
(citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945))).
312. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1782 (concluding that California courts
cannot claim specific jurisdiction).
313. See id. at 1780 (“The sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limitation
on the sovereignty of all its sister States.” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980))).
314. See id. at 1780–81 (explaining that assertions of jurisdiction rooted in
convenience result in the reciprocal divestment of another State’s power).
315. Id. at 1777–84.
316. Id. at 1782.
317. While many cases and commentators tend to pose the liberty interest
issue with regard to an improper forum in terms of convenience, the real issue for
corporate defendants may be that of multiplication of possible forums, with the
resulting likelihood that litigation can be located in unfriendly venues. For an
international company capable of doing business worldwide, it seems unlikely
that suit in one state versus another would be so inconvenient from a logistics
standpoint as to matter, especially in today’s digital, globalized, outsourced world.
Vendors will be found to handle document production and discovery; files will be
exchanged, almost all electronically. Resolution will come in time. There is a
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Somewhat surprisingly Justice Alito grounded the opinion in
terms of state sovereignty.318 The kind of due process, fundamental
fairness analysis employed up until Nicastro could have identified
a lack of fundamental fairness in exposing a defendant to a
national class action in an unfriendly state because of contacts
with just one state.319 The shift to an emphasis on sovereignty,
supported by eight justices, was a different and not inevitable
path.
A vigorous dissent from Justice Sotomayor questioned the
majority’s reliance on territorial based sovereignty:
The majority’s animating concern, in the end, appears to be
federalism: “[T]erritorial limitations on the power of the
respective States,” we are informed, may—and today
do —trump even concerns about fairness to the parties. Indeed,
the majority appears to concede that this is not, at bottom, a
case about fairness but instead a case about power: one in which
“the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State . . .
the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the
controversy; [and] the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation” but personal jurisdiction still will not
lie.320

palpable unfairness, however, to being required to stand trial at whichever venue
is the most unfriendly to the defendant, whether or not that venue has any
relationship at all to the dispute. Choice of law rules might —or might
not—protect against local laws that are skewed against the defendant, but that
does not address the issue of unfriendly jury or judicial venires, and experienced
trial lawyers are quick to claim that the composition of the jury can be outcome
determinative. Expanding the choice of forums systematically disadvantages
defendants positioning litigation—and the opportunity for making
precedents —in particularly unfriendly forums. See Daniel Klerman, Rethinking
Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. LEGAL A NALYSIS 245, 247–48 (2014) (discussing issue
of local bias); Stephen E. Sachs How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction,
108 NW. L. REV. 1301, 1324 (2014) (discussing “judicial hellholes”); see also
Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 U. S. C AL . L. R EV. 241, 250–70
(2016) (discussing use of Eastern District of Texas as a preferred plaintiffs’ forum
for patent disputes).
318. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
319. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(grounding personal jurisdiction considerations in “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
320. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)).
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Seeing little reason to apply this principle against a large
corporate defendant for conduct that was national in nature and
scope, Sotomayor then went on to put her finger on the key
question that was unasked by the majority: “What interest could
any single State have in adjudicating respondents’ claims that the
other States do not share?”321
The view taken in the Nicastro plurality and Bristol-Myers
masks this issue by viewing states primary as rivals and
competitors.322 By focusing on rivalry, rather than shared
interests, the sovereignty analysis as it is being developed sees
states not as partners in a common scheme of governance but as
adversaries jealous of their rights and prerogatives.
After Nicastro and Bristol-Myers, state sovereignty seems
clearly to be resurrected as a central consideration where personal
jurisdiction is concerned.323 Viewing states first and foremost as
rivals, and eager to protect against the implicit diminution that
might come from another state asserting jurisdiction, the Court
has proved willing to engage in the explicit diminution of telling
states that they cannot entertain actions they would be willing to
hear.324 The current status shows at least a portion of the Court
very concerned with this view of sovereignty: a view which
abstractly protects state privileges while actively and directly
eviscerating the power of a state judicial system to act.

321. Id.
322. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880–81 (2011)
(likening the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the exercise of state authority);
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)
(majority opinion) (“The sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limitation on the
sovereignty of all its sister States.” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980))).
323. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV .
73, 83 (2018) (“Bristol-Myers Squibb is a particularly important case because it
continues Walden’s erosion of more relaxed relationships between the forum, the
claim, and the defendant and because it seems to validate the Nicastro plurality’s
reinvigoration of state sovereignty.”).
324. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294
(1980) (“[T]he Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.”).
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B. “Purposeful Availment” as an Inherently Flawed Analytical
Approach Towards State Sovereignty Concerns
The particular justification for this evisceration in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion was that the interests of another, unnamed
state might be impaired if New Jersey were allowed to
overreach.325 While, in theory, this can make sense, it has a curious
flavor on the facts of Nicastro. In Nicastro, after all, the tort
occurred in New Jersey, and the party injured was a New Jersey
citizen.326 As Justice Ginsberg noted, most courts worldwide would
not hesitate to assert jurisdiction on similar facts.327
Animating Justice Kennedy’s concern, it appears, is a kind of
“horizontal” federalism that looks to relationships among the
states.328 Horizontal federalism, while perhaps less categorically
articulated in the cases than the familiar vertical federalism, is
indeed inherent in the Constitution and built in to the way the
various components of the federal government work.329 That states
are limited in their reach by their territory—or more broadly, by
some interest or set of consequences related to the state
territory—is an animating assumption of the federal system.330
The concern that one state not interfere with the territorial
sovereignty of another is not entirely misplaced, of course. For
example, if Illinois were to routinely send its highway patrol across
the border into Indiana to enforce, say, driving while intoxicated
laws, Indiana would have a legitimate grievance, even if such
enforcement could be shown to stop drunken drivers before they
could cross into Illinois.

325. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 884 (noting that the federal balance depends
upon each State’s undisturbed sovereignty).
326. Id. at 877.
327. Id. at 909 (quoting 2001 O.J. (L 12) 4) (citing Case 21/76,
Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R.
1735).
328. See, e.g., Erbsen, supra note 234, at 494 (defining “horizontal federalism”
as the coordination of the boundaries of coequal states).
329. Id. at 497 (describing “horizontal federalism” as a “potentially coherent
field of law lurking amidst [the Constitution’s] components usually viewed in
isolation”).
330. Id. (discussing the ways in which the Constitution creates inherent
limits on state power).
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Extending horizontal federalism concerns to the courts also is
neither new nor inherently troubling. If states are limited in their
reach outside their community, it makes sense for litigation—and
regulation by litigation—to be included in those limits. Theories of
regulatory legitimacy require some connection between the
community imposing its standards and those subject to the
imposition.331
Where it becomes odd, and it becomes very odd, is when a rival
state is viewed as the principal stakeholder, and the inquiry is
grafted into an analytical structure that for the past half century
has claimed to largely be about individual liberty interests.332
Purposeful availment makes sense as the motivating engine of
minimum contacts when the core of the inquiry is the defendant’s
liberty interest, and the test is whether it is fair and reasonable to
drag that defendant into a distant forum.333 If the defendant has
chosen in some knowing way to build a relationship with a forum,
it can hardly seem unfair or unreasonable to make him answer in
court for violations related to that relationship and those
contacts.334
However, in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro and Justice
Alito’s in Bristol-Myers purposeful availment continued to be the
touchstone for an analysis that seemed to be motivated less by
concern about liberty interests than about rivalrous state power.335
States have a structural interest in other states not overreaching
331. See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the
Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV . 689, 689 (1987) (asserting that
legitimate exercises of jurisdiction should reflect the general limits of state
sovereignty).
332. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702–03 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and
protects an individual liberty interest.”).
333. See id. at 703 (requiring “the maintenance of suit . . . not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))).
334. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that
the privilege of conducting certain activities within a state may justifiably give
rise to obligations in connection with those activities).
335. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011)
(characterizing inappropriately exercised state sovereignty as an upset to the
federal balance); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1780 (2017) (including state sovereignty as a “primary concern” in determining
whether personal jurisdiction is present).
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their proper space,336 but Kennedy tried to set the boundaries
between states based on a test that in the end focuses on little more
than the defendant’s antecedent state of mind.337
The focus on “purposeful availment” shifts the exercise of this
kind of horizontal federalism away from a state’s structural
interest vis-à-vis other states, and onto the unpredictable and
inherently unprincipled question of “what state was the defendant
thinking about when it put a product into the stream of
commerce?”338 If one is looking to balance the interests of two
states with regard to which should be able to host a lawsuit
involving an injury, which state a foreign defendant years or
decades before purposefully wanted a relationship with seems an
odd way to draw the boundary. It substitutes inherently subjective
thought processes on the part of potential defendants339 for
structural concerns when deciding which state, under the federal
scheme, has the most connection to the lawsuit, and whether any
other states have a reason to resist the assertion of jurisdiction.340
In Nicastro, for example, a New Jersey resident was injured
by a machine sold into New Jersey and operated in New Jersey.341
What trumped New Jersey’s power to litigate a New Jersey centric
dispute over whether the machine was safe, in the eyes of the
plurality, were marketing plans made decades before by the
British manufacturer.342 Because there was no showing that the
336. Some commentators agree, and agree with the notion that rival states
are aggrieved. See Erbsen, supra note 285, at 38–60 (arguing for state interest
and importance of state borders); Parry, supra note 134, at 855 (protecting
individual interests in personal jurisdiction analysis also protects the sovereign
interests of other states); Stein, supra note 331, at 710–11 (“It remains offensive
to the federal system, and accordingly to the individual defendant, for a state
without a legitimate regulatory claim to assert authority.”).
337. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in
Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. RES . L. REV . 769, 769 (2016) (arguing that
Justice Kennedy would have found jurisdiction over the defendant in Nicastro
only if J. McIntyre had specifically targeted New Jersey).
338. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 885 (requiring defendant engage in conduct
directed at a specific state).
339. See Schmitt, supra note 337, at 769 (“The purposeful availment
requirement, for example, is tied to the subjective intentions of the defendant
rather than the sovereign power of the states.”).
340. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
341. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 878.
342. See id. at 886 (requiring a showing that the manufacturer purposefully
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British defendant, who all agreed was targeting the entire U.S.
market, happened to attend a trade show in New Jersey, or buy an
advertisement specifically aimed at New Jersey, or otherwise
evince an interest in New Jersey greater than in other states, New
Jersey was shunted aside in its power to hear the dispute in favor
of those other states with no current connection to the dispute, but
whose territories were actively in the mind of the defendant as it
prepared to sell into the U.S. market.343
To the extent the concern is horizontal federalism, moreover,
it’s not clear why the Court treats personal jurisdiction as a perfect
proxy for the state comity concerns that can arise under horizontal
federalism.344 If a state could have objections to another state
hearing a lawsuit in which it has an interest, it would seem likely
that personal jurisdiction is only one of many situations where that
might arise. Imagine, for example, a case in which a New York
state court is asked to hear a case that will require analysis of an
unresolved issue of Delaware corporate law, with both the plaintiff
and defendant being Delaware domiciliaries, and with the
defendant having expressly waived personal jurisdiction and
venue defenses. Delaware might care more about keeping
interpretation of its legal code in its own courts than it does about
inconvenience to its domiciliary, but no likely vehicle exists for
asserting that interest.
In other cases—and Nicastro seems a prime example—the
“other” state that can claim purposeful availment may have little
interest in the litigation at all. Imagine a case with facts like
Nicastro, where the defendant is not now and never has been
domiciled in its state, its own law will under no circumstances be
applicable, and its superior claim to the lawsuit exists only because
of a purpose formed, perhaps unbeknownst to the forum state,
through the thoughts and unilateral actions of the defendant, with
no state involvement. In such a case, however, as in Nicastro, if the
defendant asserts its rights, “our federalism” takes the case away

availed itself of the New Jersey market).
343. See id. (“[I]t is [the manufacturer’s] purposeful contacts with New Jersey,
not with the United States, that alone are relevant.”).
344. See Erbsen, supra note 285, at 89–96 (discussing the utility of a comity
rule within jurisdictional inquiries).
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from the site of the tort and the home of the plaintiff to a state with
at best a glancing connection to the dispute.
These are not the kinds of issues Justice Kennedy examined
in waving a hand towards our federalism. Indeed, exactly how
purposeful availment relates to horizontal allocation of state power
was not a topic Justice Kennedy addressed. He was clear, however,
that the lack of such subjective focus on the state was sufficient to
strip a state of its adjudicative power, and to make illegal any
judgment rendered.345
To the extent the Court’s sudden emphasis on state
sovereignty reflects just another zig in the Court’s zigzagging
search for a rationale underlying personal jurisdiction, binding
only until the next case takes a different tack, perhaps it is of little
consequence.346 As one scholar has noted:
The Supreme Court has similarly been unable to articulate a
stable method for addressing disputes about personal
jurisdiction. Doctrine vacillates along multiple dyads:
sometimes emphasizing state sovereignty and other times
emphasizing individual rights, sometimes focusing on a state’s
power over actors and other times on power arising from the
local effects of their actions, and sometimes relying on a rule’s
historical pedigree and other times discounting it. Likewise, the
Court has unhelpfully opined that the forum state’s interests in
providing a forum matter except when they don’t, that burdens
on nonresident defendants are material except when they
aren’t, and that the plaintiff’s interest in finding a convenient
forum is important except when it isn’t. 347

To the extent the Court seriously intends going forward to
assert a horizontal state sovereignty version of “our federalism”
while still employing a purposeful availment analysis—and
Bristol-Myers suggests that this is exactly where the court is
headed—it raises serious questions about how the Court views
federalism. In addition, the emphasis on protecting states from
345. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883–85 (2011)
(drawing no connection between purposeful availment the and the federalist
system of government).
346. See George Rutherglen, Personal Jurisdiction and Political Authority, 32
J.L. & POL . 1, 1 (2016) (“This ambiguity in theory has led to deleterious
consequences in practice by forcing together the disparate elements of sovereignty
and individual rights into the more specific tests for personal jurisdiction.”).
347. See Erbsen, supra note 285, at 4–5.
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concurrent exercises of power by other states with a connection to
the matter suggests a view of state relations drawn primarily from
international relations among independent sovereigns, a view that
is at fundamental odds with the “more perfect union” created by
the Constitution.348
A certain level of concurrency is built into the Constitutional
system. At one level, of course, citizens are subject to both state
and federal power.349 Beyond that, it is not exceptional for more
than one state to be able to exercise over a party based on one
pattern of conduct.350 For example, that one state brings criminal
charges does not prevent another state with a nexus from bringing
charges that would be barred in the original state by the double
jeopardy charge.351 Similarly, a citizen travelling or even residing
outside her home state might be subject to both home state and
host state regulation, even if the applicable rules conflict.352 While
the boundaries of concurrent assertions of power depend on the
facts and can be open to debate, there is no question that
overlapping assertions of power are a basic feature of the federal
system.353
The approach adopted by the plurality in Nicastro and the
Court in Bristol-Myers, however, argues that states are diminished
when other states exercise concurrent power.354 This concern
348. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
349. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (“A State’s interest in
vindicating its sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws by definition
can never be satisfied by another State’s enforcement of its own laws.” (emphasis
in original)).
351. Id.
352. See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 855, 856 (2002) (arguing that states have the presumptive power
to regulate the activity of their citizens).
353. See id. (“Such diversity among polities is one of frequently heralded
benefits of our federal system.” (citing Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1558
(2000))). Some scholars, such as Professor Brilmayer, argue for Constitutional
rules that limit concurrency in at least some settings. See Lea Brilmayer,
Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right to Die,
91 MICH. L. REV . 873, 876 (1993) (“[T]he structure of our federal system clearly
compels the priority of the territorial state, and . . . this priority typically
invalidates the residence state’s claim to regulate.”). Others, such as Rosen, argue
for accepting concurrency as a feature of the system.
354. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 884 (2011) (“[I]f another State were to assert
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inspires the Court to strip states of power to adjudicate, even when
the litigation has some real relationship to the forum.
At one level, if this kind of horizontal federalism is to become
the driving concern behind personal jurisdiction doctrine, the test
and the analysis should fit the focus. Rather than looking at which
jurisdiction a defendant preferred to have a relationship with, an
inherently defendant-focused inquiry, the emphasis should shift to
which state has the best claim—or least a justifiable claim—to host
the litigation. In this regard, what state the defendant proposed to
have a relationship with will not be the only interest, or the best
guide.355 Beyond that, however, is the question of whether
horizontal federalism as it operates really is a zero-sum game.
C. The Reality of Cooperative, Polycentric Federalism
In assessing the Court’s summary invocation of “our
federalism,” a fundamental question of whether the Court’s view
of jealous rivals who are best viewed as independent sovereigns is
the best approach. Even giving horizontal federalism full due, and
even assuming that a Court bent on making horizontal federalism
the core concern of personal jurisdiction can come up with a better
test than purposeful availment, the situation is not so simple as
two unconnected sovereigns living side by side. As a matter of
fundamental law, states are not independent sovereigns, but
members of a common union.356 As a practical matter, it would do
Illinois no good, and much harm, if Indiana were to become a
jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance. . . .”);
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017)
(discussing how the sovereignty of each state limits the sovereignty of other
states).
355. Some scholars, in line with this, see the Dormant Commerce Clause,
rather than Due Process, as the most appropriate source of Constitutional power
to limit assertions of personal jurisdiction. See Chad DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal
Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 79 GEO. W ASH. L. R EV. 995, 999 (2011) (“The dormant Commerce Clause,
not due process, is offended by [state overreaching].”).
356. See Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (“The
Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less
parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division.”).
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lawless jungle. The repose of the citizens of any state depends
substantially on the stability and orderliness of its neighboring
states. Put differently, putting the Indiana courts out of business
on the theory that they might intrude on legitimate Illinois
assertions of sovereignty is not inexorably to Illinois’s benefit.
Beyond that, “our federalism” as it has evolved shows
neighboring states pursuing largely parallel and consistent
systems of law.357 A car fit to drive in Indiana—with working
headlights and tail lights, for example—is likely to be fit to drive
under the laws applicable in Illinois. Both states have adopted
versions of the Uniform Commercial Code to govern the sale of
goods, leading to largely consistent if not identical rules.358
Doctrines such as full faith and credit assume, and succeed,
because notwithstanding some differences, the legal regimes in the
various sovereign states follow a largely common model and
pursue largely compatible ends. 359 Beyond that, to the extent the
question boils down to one of community, and the legitimacy of
applying a community’s rules to an outsider, it should be
remembered that all states ultimately are members of the same
sovereignty and same overarching community, that of the United
States, and due weight should be given to that integrated
community before sending litigants to wholly foreign legal
systems.
Differences exist from state to state, of course, but when the
result of the Supreme Court’s denying jurisdictional reach is
perhaps to force litigants to pursue claims against overseas
defendants in overseas jurisdictions, these differences should not
be exaggerated. A foreign country is, indeed, a separate sovereign,
perhaps operating under a very different system of laws. Another
state is a co-equal member of the same federal union and of the
same sovereign community, applying laws that spring from the
same sources and that for a number of reasons tend to be more
357. See Andrew Karch, The States and American Political Development, in
THE O XFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 365, 378
(Richard Valelly et al. eds., 2016) (highlighting the fundamental similarities of
states).
358. See Table of Jurisdictions Listing Uniform Acts Adopted, in Directory of
Uniform Acts and Codes U.L.A. 9, 31 & n.1 (1994 Pamphlet).
359. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 234, at 1 (identifying constitutional doctrines
that unite the states).
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alike than not.360 Indirect means such as standardization,
horizontal diffusion of law, adoption of common model codes, as
well as direct means such as compliance with federal standards,
tend to spread a base level of commonality across states. 361 While
differences are real, and can matter, the tendency of lawyers and
law professors to spot distinctions and draw lines should not
obscure the degree to which those distinctions reside in largely
parallel systems that exist within a shared political community.362
While each state has an interest in maintaining a zone of
sovereignty, it also has an interest—an interest implicit in the very
“more perfect union”363 asserted in the preamble as the reason for
the Constitution and in the political community created by that
Constitution—in acting in ways that cooperate with364 and
reinforce governance norms in neighboring states.365 States can
and do differ, and differ in consequential ways, but at least as
importantly they function in mutually reinforcing ways.366
360. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (“‘This Union’ was and is a
union of States, equal in power, dignity, and authority, each competent to exert
that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution itself.”).
361. See Karch, supra note 357, at 376 (“In devising social policies, the states
interact not only with the national government but also with each other.
Observers have long marveled at the spread of innovative programs from state to
state.”).
362. See Charles D. Tarlton, Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of
Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation, 27 J. POL. 861, 861 (1965) (discussing the
symmetrical characteristics of the federal system).
363. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
364. The Court identified an example of this in Keeton, where it noted that
the “single publication rule” involved cooperation and shared interests across
multiple states. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984)
(“New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperating with other States,
through the ‘single publication rule,’ to provide a forum for efficiently litigating
all issues and damage claims arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding.”).
365. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 242, at 112 (“[M]ost interstate
interactions involve cooperation, not conflict.”); Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199–200 (1996) (arguing that
states cooperate as well as compete, with compliance with norms being a winning
strategy in a reiterated prisoner’s dilemma game); see generally Note, To Form a
More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV .
L. REV. 842 (1989) (discussing formal and informal cooperation between state
officials such as attorney generals).
366. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 234, at 1 (“These horizontal relations may be
cooperative as manifested by interstate compacts, uniform state laws, reciprocity
statutes, administrative agreements, and regional and national associations of
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Governance works not just through coercive power, but through
voluntary adoption of common norms.367
To some degree, the commonality is required by the
Constitution.368 The Supremacy Clause requires states to yield to
federal power when there is a conflict in an area where the federal
government is empowered and has chosen to act.369 In this regard,
states often have little choice but to cooperate with federal
programs and initiatives. The incorporation of most of the Bill of
Rights against the states creates other areas of commonality.370
Notwithstanding state preferences, the Constitutional mandate
demands compatible rules.
Congressional actions can also lead to convergence of state
laws and policies. Federal preemption can override areas where
states choose divergent paths, and so the threat of preemption can
nudge states toward consistent policies.371 In other areas, states
adopt local versions of federal laws (such as Little FTC Acts or
state antitrust acts), with the common federal template leading to
similarity.372
But beyond that there is much voluntary commonality.373 The
nearly universal adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code is not
state government officers.”).
367. See Paul Schiff Berman, Federalism and International Law Through the
Lens of Legal Pluralism, 73 MO. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2008) (“[R]ational choice
understandings of how international law works or pure theory debates about
sovereignty are limited because they focus too heavily on coercive power, thereby
giving insufficient attention to the role of rhetorical persuasion, informal
articulations of legal norms, and networks of affiliation that may not possess
literal enforcement power.”).
368. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 234, at 1 (listing constitutional doctrines
that compel commonality between the states).
369. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (commanding that the laws of the United
States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see also Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (identifying the ways in which the
express will of Congress preempts state action).
370. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 746 n.12, 764–65, 765
n.13 (2010) (providing the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights).
371. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 234, at 212 (“If states fail to exercise their
reserved powers in a cooperative manner to replace the labyrinth of conflicting
laws impeding commerce by harmonizing their civil statutes, Congress will
continue to preempt their regulatory authority.”).
372. Id.
373. See Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights,
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required by any federal mandate, but it allows each state to
operate effectively in national commerce.374 To the extent there are
local flavors—and there are—they exist within a common
structure that has been voluntarily adopted.375 The UCC is just one
of many uniform statutes with national and near national reach.376
Beyond the UCC, state courts choose to follow the Restatements,
or adopt legal rules first advanced by sister states.377
Formal and informal organizations also lead to diffusion of
policies across state lines.378 Organizations such as the National
Association of Attorney Generals or the Conference of Chief
Justices establish relationships across state lines, which in turn
can lead to influence. Nongovernmental organizations, such as the

De-essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in
FEDERALISM AND S UBSIDIARITY 403–05 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds.,
2014) (discussing how translocal organizations of government actors coordinate
formally and informally to homogenize policy); Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin &
Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and
Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. R EV. 709,
710 (2008) (discussing cooperative state and local action on climate change
issues).
374. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1996) (observing that State
laws tend to be uniform where uniformity serves economic efficiency, but in some
cases economically inefficient laws gain adoption due to authority of process);
John Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48
W AYNE L. R EV . 1387, 1392 (2003) (arguing that “economic analysis supports
public policy in favor of unification of law if certain conditions, outlined in the
article, are met”); see generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change,
49 UCLA L. REV . 789 (2002) (exploring “friction” costs of changing legal rules).
375. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1557 (describing state
authority as subject to yet distinct from national authority).
376. See Uniform Commercial Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
https://perma.cc/27NA-TECD (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (providing background
on the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
377. See Karch, supra note 357, at 376 (describing the interactions between
states in devising new policy).
378. It has been argued that at an international level, the diffusion of
concerns and answers across decentralized networks of regulators facing similar
concerns plays a key role in international cooperation. See Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the
Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. I NT ’L L. 1, 4 (2002).
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American Law Institute, can play a similar role, even absent
formal actions.379
There is so much consistency across state lines, and so much
consistency that by its nature provides no cause for controversy or
litigation, that it can be easy to overlook the deep structural
importance of this commonality.380 It is worth remembering that
one legal issue on which the states differed deeply, the legality of
human chattel slavery, created unsustainable divisions in a
structure that implicitly assumes high levels of common cause.381
Given this deep similarity, one has to ask, as Justice
Sotomayor asked: how much is a state injured if another state
enforces a legal duty very much like that carried on the state’s own
books?382 Even if one could identify the state deprived of its right
to host a lawsuit, does it care? Should it care?
Even if a state might care about another state’s hosting of a
lawsuit, the question remains whether constitutionalized
intervention by the federal judicial branch is the best way to
address the issue. Constitutionalizing due process standards in a
379. See Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal
Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal
Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 44 (2007)
These various organizations, including the National League of Cities,
the United States Conference of Mayors, the National Conference of
State Legislatures, the National Governors’ Association, the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the National Conference
of Chief Justices of State Courts, are conduits for border crossings, both
state-to-state and internationally.
Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE L. & POL ’ Y REV. 465,
477–78 (1996)
Be it state compacts, ad hoc regulatory arrangements of a group of
states (sometimes prompted by or in response to federal regulation),
mechanisms to adopt uniform laws, or the creation of new
organizations to affect national political and legal life, actors—in and
out of government—are trying an array of arrangements to respond to
both new and old problems.
380. See Resnik, supra note 373, at 373 (describing the United States as
“exemplifying” federalism symmetry).
381. Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism—An
American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 227, 237 (1996) (discussing how federalism not only protected slavery
but went on to perpetuate racial segregation and discrimination).
382. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1788
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (identifying no unique interest among the
states potentially interested in this litigation).
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rapidly evolving world places issues beyond political debate. Given
that states have shown that they know how to cooperate and how
to seek political help when cooperation fails, it’s not clear that the
Court’s tender concern about hypothetical conflicts serves anyone’s
interests.383
These issues are heightened when the defendant comes from
outside the borders of the United States, but has chosen to act
within the U.S.384 In a case such as Nicastro, should hypothetical
internal rivalries result in cancelling assertions of U.S. sovereignty
against foreign defendants?385 In some cases, the state specific
targeting required under Justice Kennedy’s approach in Nicastro
would leave a foreign defendant immune from suit—and hence
beyond U.S. regulation via litigation—anywhere in the United
States.386
The analysis is not helped by the Court’s summary invocation
of sovereignty with no exploration of what that entails.
Sovereignty, as quickly becomes apparent after even the briefest
examination of the literature, is a slippery and difficult term. Even
in the context of free-standing international states, what exactly
we mean by sovereignty quickly proves elusive.387
383. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 242, at 111–12
[T]he social science confirms what politics has shown. In many areas,
there are robust, cooperative networks among federal, state, and local
officials that can and do safeguard horizontal federalism. The
horizontal parts of these networks provide the fora needed for states to
work out the conflict for themselves. And the vertical dimensions of
these networks allow state and local officials in conflict to pull in a
national referee when they need one without regularly resorting to the
courts.
384. See Lilly, supra note 156, at 85–86 (“The concerns of interstate
federalism that apparently motivate strict limits upon state adjudicatory power
are most questionable when invoked by an alien defendant.”).
385. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
386. See Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(2): A Way to (Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U.
L. REV. 413, 418 (2017) (“[S]ome foreign defendants can benefit commercially
from the U.S. market yet avoid suit in any U.S. court . . . .”).
387. See ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY : EVOLUTION OF AN I DEA xi–xii
(2007) (“The idea of sovereignty is a big idea. It defies academic attempts to pin
it down and fit it into tidy analytical categories. When we think we have managed
that feat we discover another angle or dimension of the subject that we have not
considered.”); Hent Kalmo & Quentin Skinner, Introduction, A Concept in
Fragments, in SOVEREIGNTY IN FRAGMENTS : THE P AST , PRESENT AND F UTURE OF
A C ONTESTED C ONCEPT 1 (Hent Kalmo & Quentin Skinner eds., 2010) (“The
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That problem of elusiveness only becomes more pronounced in
the context of the U.S. federal system.388 As the Constitutional
preamble reminds us, the U.S. government is at its core a union—a
coalition, a joining of forces and interests.389 In that union, states
retain some elements of independent sovereignty while
simultaneously being full constituent parts of the sovereign
union.390
The sovereignty discussion has tended to focus attention on
the degree to which states retain independent control.391 In some
ways this makes sense—litigation tends to focus on boundary
situations where there is some rivalrous contesting for control,
whether between a state and the federal government, or between
two states.392 The legal academy’s focus on reported cases tends to
center interest on those aspects of sovereignty that are legally
actionable.393
But, in other ways, this discussion obscures a deeper reality of
sovereignty in our federal system. As noted above, portraying the
states as jealous adversaries presents at best an incomplete
picture of how they relate—much as focusing exclusively on the
squabbles of married couples would obscure that they are
nonetheless partners in a common enterprise. That they fight for
more control of the sheets does not change the fact that they are
lying in the same bed.
status of sovereignty as a highly ambiguous concept is well established.”);
HIDEAKI SHINODA, RE-EXAMINING SOVEREIGNTY : FROM CLASSICAL T HEORY TO
THE GLOBAL A GE 1 (2000) (“Since the end of the Cold War, academics as well as
practitioners have identified the concept of sovereignty as one of the most critical
and elusive topics.”).
388. Notwithstanding, concepts of sovereignty were discussed, at high levels
of sophistication, at the outset of the events that led to the Revolution. See ALISON
L. LACROIX, T HE I DEOLOGICAL O RIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 68–104
(2010).
389. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
390. See Erbsen, supra note 233, at 494 (describing the allocation of power in
a federalist system).
391. See, e.g., id. at 510 (noting the inevitable friction between fifty
“mini-spheres” of sovereignty).
392. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 3 (identifying the United States’ reliance
on adversarial legalism).
393. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 293
(1980) (rooting the permissible exercise of jurisdiction in considerations of
sovereignty).
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Their sovereignty, such as it is, derives not from their
international standing but from the terms of the marriage compact
that is the Constitution.394 Every legitimate state action involves
the assertion of a sovereignty based on the sovereign union.395 Put
differently, while there may have been a time when New Jersey
could have elected to be an independent sovereign, since 1788 its
every sovereign act has been as part of a national union. That it is
allocated areas of exclusive control within that union does not
change the fact that, no less than the federal government, states
have only those powers given to them or preserved under the
Constitution, and exercise them not as independent sovereign
states but as part of a compound republic.396
State power may differ from federal power, and may differ
from the power of another state, but all ultimately arise under the
Constitution.397 The national power of the compound republic is
expressed in different settings, and these different settings include
state assertions of power just as much as federal assertions of
power.398 All are expressions of the national power and sovereignty
of the United States.399
For the most part, the union exists not as the additive whole
of separate and exclusive sovereignties, but as an even more
complex brew of overlapping and often duplicative governments.
The Court’s failure to take into account the actual nature of this
complex sovereignty fatally handicaps its sovereignty analysis.
D. State Sovereignty and Horizontal Federalism in the Age of
Legal Pluralism
It is somewhat ironic that the Supreme Court started worrying
about jurisdictional monogamy, protecting rivalrous states from
394. See Erbsen, supra note 233, at 509 (noting the Constitution’s grant of
power to the several states).
395. Id.
396. ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 346 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)).
397. See id. at 347–48 (describing areas of authority left to the states).
398. See id. (identifying areas of convergence).
399. See id. (noting that the national government and the states share
governmental sovereignty).
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competing assertions of power, just at that time that others
worldwide have recognized that we live in an age of legal
pluralism—an age where in any given space the players are subject
to multiple formal and informal legal orders.400 The notion that a
single sovereign would have exclusive power over its citizenry has
never held true in the compound republic of the United States, and
holds even less true today as globalization, the rise of non-state
rule making bodies, and inherently non-territorial environments
such as the internet further complicate the situation.401
As one scholar has noted:
[Today a] single act or actor is potentially regulated by multiple
legal or quasi-legal regimes. Law often operates based on a
convenient fiction that nation-states exist in autonomous,
territorially distinct spheres and that activities therefore fall
under the legal jurisdiction of only one regime at a time. Thus,
traditional legal rules have tied jurisdiction to territory: a state
could exercise complete authority within its territorial borders
and no authority beyond it. In the twentieth century, such rules
were loosened, but territorial location remained the principal
touchstone for assigning legal authority. Accordingly, if one
could spatially ground a dispute, one could most likely
determine the legal rule that would apply. 402

In the modern world, however, the autonomous nation-state
with exclusive sway over its territory has less purchase.
Technological changes such as rapid movement of people and
400. See generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM : A
J URISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND B ORDERS (2012) [hereinafter, BERMAN, GLOBAL
LEGAL PLURALISM ]; TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday &
Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015); MICHAEL D. MCGINNIS, POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL
PUBLIC E CONOMIES : READINGS FROM THE W ORKSHOP IN POLITICAL T HEORY AND
POLICY ANALYSIS (1999); OSTROM & ALLEN, supra note 9; FRANCIS SNYDER, T HE
EU, THE WTO AND CHINA : LEGAL PLURALISM AND I NTERNATIONAL T RADE
REGULATION 29–88 (2010); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 490 (2002); Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law
to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM . J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 485 (2005); Paul Schiff
Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. R EV. 1819 (2005); Robert
M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 W M. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering
the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL . L. REV. 2369 (2008).
401. For a review of the literature and tracing of the development of the field,
see Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & S OC. SCI .
225 (2009).
402. BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM , supra note 400, at 4.
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products, placeless technologies such as internet clouds and
satellites,
international
treaty
organizations
and
non-governmental standard setting organizations, along with
traditional nonstate players such as religious communities, all
play a role alongside sovereign states.
In this world:
[A] simple model that looks only to territorial delineations
among official state-based legal systems is now simply
untenable
(if
it
was
ever
useful
to
begin
with) . . . . [N]ation-states must work within a framework of
multiple overlapping jurisdictional assertions by state,
international, and even nonstate communities. Each of these
types of overlapping jurisdictional assertions creates a
potentially hybrid legal space that is not easily eliminated.403

Even at the national level, legal pluralism cannot be wished
away, and trying to protect states from insults to their sovereignty
should another entity have some type of jurisdiction is doomed to
failure.404 In many if not most cases, there is no single proper
forum; in many if not most cases, states are not injured if others
have a claim to participate.405 The proper question is whether a
forum has sufficient connection to a dispute to legitimately
exercise power.406
This cannot be a question solely based on territorial lines.
Horizontal limits are primarily a function of community rather
than just geography.407 The question is not where geographically a
defendant may be compelled to appear, but which communities
should have the power to make him appear and to render

403. See id. at 5.
404. See id. at 14 (“[H]ybridity is a reality we cannot escape . . . .”).
405. See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1788
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (implying that states share parallel interests
in adjudicating certain claims).
406. Id.
407. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The
Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 (2007)
(“[J]urisdiction entails more than territorial and formalistic inquiries into
applicable law and the authority of a given court in a particular dispute. These
authors have instead engaged it as a ‘locus for debates about community
definition, sovereignty, and legitimacy.’”).
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judgment. This is less a question of location and convenience than
of political legitimacy.408
Particularly when international defendants are involved, and
when the alternative may be for a U.S. plaintiff to seek redress in
an alien jurisdiction, it is worth remembering that that all U.S.
states are members of the same political community. Each state
expresses, and can only express, a facet of U.S. political power. To
send plaintiffs altogether out of that community because of overly
fine concerns about where internal lines might be drawn weakens
and offends, rather than preserves, the political community
created by “our federalism.”409
The defendant’s ex ante “availment” and state of mind are
unlikely to prove an exclusive guide to political legitimacy, because
the defendant is not the only actor in the play. An unrelated
forum—such as California would have been in the Daimler
litigation—raises deep legitimacy issues, but a related forum that
was not at the top of the defendant’s mind at the time crucial
actions were taken is, in other nation-states, recognized as a
legitimate forum.410 If a state has a regulatory or compensatory
interest, and must live with the consequences of the defendant’s
misconduct, it’s hard to see why the defendant’s projections about
where its actions might have an impact should stifle further
analysis.
408. See Sachs, supra note 317, at 1312 (“But we shouldn’t be surprised that
personal jurisdiction implicates the allocation of power across nations and across
states—or that our intuitive answers might actually depend on complex theories
of political authority or international law.”).
409. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 6, at 1229 (“[T]he burdens on the
plaintiff of being forced to bring suit in a foreign country counterbalance any
assertions of unfairness by an alien in having to defend in the United States.”);
Erbsen, supra note 285, at 26
[E]ven if the burdens of litigating in a particular forum would be severe
for the defendant, the burdens of not litigating in that forum would
often be equally severe for the plaintiff. Jurisdictional dismissals
redistribute burdens rather than eliminate them: refusing to force a
defendant to travel to the forum can force the plaintiff to travel from
the forum.
410. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro 564 U.S. 873, 909 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The European Court of Justice has interpreted this
prescription to authorize jurisdiction either where the harmful act occurred or at
the place of injury.” (citing Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines
de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735)).
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Still more importantly, one state’s assertion of power should
not be viewed as another state’s loss. On the ground, rather than
existing in separate pseudo-Westphalian silos states and the
federal government, whether one looks horizontally or vertically,
states engage in regulatory dialogues, putting resources where
others have not, and acting consciously or unconsciously in
concert.411 On the ground, regulatory reality is more muddled and
intermingled than subject to the bright lines beloved by legal
minds.412
In a deeply pluralistic system where national and
international actors can expect to be regulated and held to account
by multiple jurisdictions, and in a national system where the laws
if not identical are least of the same legal family, Justice
Sotomayor’s question in Bristol-Myers deserves thoughtful
consideration: What unique interest in a litigation does a state
have that might not be shared by others?413 In the case of
Bristol-Myers, all states had similar interests in regulating
identical products.414 In other cases, it may be that a state has a
unique and special regulatory interest that it would want to
vindicate directly. Again, however, this special regulatory interest
is unlikely to be revealed by the defendant’s ex ante thought
processes.
It must be recognized that assertions of state power are
ultimately assertions of national power—states have separate
spheres, to be sure, but they are intertwined parts rather than
independent free agents.415 Curtailing state power also curtails
national power.416 Especially where foreign defendants are
involved, shutting down a legitimate state forum limits the reach
of national after-the-fact regulation.417 Given that most such
litigation as regulation occurs in state, not federal, courts, and that
411. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 865–68 (discussing cooperative regulation).
412. See id. at 865 (“In such regimes, discrete sets of regulatory rules may
collapse into a collective whole.”).
413. Bristol-Meyers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
414. Id.
415. See BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM , supra note 400, at 4 (labeling
the concept of states as distinct spheres a “convenient fiction”).
416. See, e.g., Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 873 (Kennedy, J., plurality) (foreclosing
reach of domestic courts in exercising jurisdiction over a foreign defendant).
417. Id.
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states are entitled to assert such regulatory power, cutting off state
power to adjudicate must be recognized as the insult to national
sovereignty that it is.418
IV. Conclusion
State sovereignty ultimately is national sovereignty. To
exaggerate concepts of state exclusiveness in a modern age of legal
pluralism serves only to diminish the sovereignty of individual
states, and, ultimately, the nation as a whole by constricting how
legitimate U.S. regulatory power can be exercised through
litigatory regulation.
Texas and Massachusetts, however different they are, are
more like each other than either is like China. Massachusetts is
not Scandinavia; Texas is not Chile. While there are fiercely
contested intramural differences, and while contesting those
intramural differences has consequences both locally and in terms
of national development,419 paying due regard to differences should
not lead to ignoring the profound commonalities amongst states
bound together in one union and one political community.
The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant is
an alien. Requiring an alien to target an individual state, rather
than the nation as a whole, leaves the U.S. with a narrower
jurisdictional reach than other countries, and risks driving U.S.
citizens to a foreign jurisdiction to seek redress. The loss of
sovereignty is that of the United States as a nation.

418. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 608 (1981) (discussing the ways in which the
Constitution channels the adjudication of federal questions to state courts).
419. See ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 348 (“[M]ost of the contentious policy
conflicts in American history originated at the state and local levels of
government.”).

